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One who grabs too much has not grabbed anything, but one that
grabs just a little has surely grabbed that much.
—Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 80a
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling that West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself
from a case involving a major donor to his judicial election campaign
violated Due Process1 sparked a storm of interest in the (in)adequacy
of the judicial disqualification system.2 Contemporary recusal law
makes conclusory determinations of actual or apparent judicial bias,
resulting in an inconsistent doctrine that allows dishonest judges to
resist recusal and supplant litigants’ legal rights in favor of their own
personal agendas.3 The current approach also erodes public confidence in the justice system by under and over-enforcing bias-based
recusal,4 and its focus on top-down mandatory disqualification fails to
adequately encourage judges to be personally and professionally
integrious.5
This Note suggests that these problems might be mitigated by
comprehensively rethinking our approach to judicial disqualification
based on halacha, traditional Jewish law.6 Halachic recusal law offers
an alternative to the current American approach, a jurisprudence that
is grounded in courts’ and judges’ personal and professional duties,
and which empowers jurists to develop their own integrity by limiting
mandatory disqualification and relying instead on judges’ dutyconsciousness and self-disciplining decisions to voluntarily recuse.7
Part I of this Note reviews the jurisprudential underpinnings and
substantive rules of American and traditional Jewish disqualification
law. Part II briefly compares these two systems, highlighting the
1. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57 (2009); see
also infra notes 81–84 and 101–105 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges,
58 DRAKE L. REV. 661 (2010); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company: What’s Due Process Got to Do With It?, 63
BAYLOR L. REV. 368 (2011); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial
Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); Symposium: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 (2010).
3. See infra Part III.A.1.
4. See infra Part III.A.2.
5. See infra Part III.A.3.
6. See generally infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.1.
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principle differences between the American and halachic approaches
to recusal, which stem from these doctrines’ respective foundations in
rights-based and duty-focused jurisprudence. Part III develops a duty-focused alternative to contemporary recusal law by first highlighting some deficiencies in the current system, thereby demonstrating
the need for reform,8 and by then reconceptualizing judicial recusal
based on Jewish law’s moralizing, duty-oriented approach to removing judges and promoting judicial integrity.9
I. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN AMERICAN AND
TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW
This Part provides necessary background for considering the relative merits of contemporary American and traditional Jewish recusal
law by explaining the jurisprudential underpinnings and substantive
doctrines. Section I.A. discusses the American law of judicial disqualification, and Section I.B. lays out the basic contours of the halachic
approach to removing judges.
A. The American Approach to Judicial Disqualification
This Section discusses the contemporary American approach to judicial disqualification. Section I.A.1 explores the two primary objectives of modern recusal doctrine: protecting litigants’ rights against
biased rulings, and promoting public confidence in the justice system.
Building on this framework, Section I.A.2 summarizes the substantive
grounds for a judge’s removal under current federal, state, and American Bar Association rules.

1.

The Underlying Goals of American Recusal Jurisprudence

Contemporary judicial disqualification law is built on a dual concern for protecting the rights of litigants in individual cases and with
preserving public confidence in the court system generally. Litigants
are entitled to a court ruling based on the legal merits of their case rather than extraneous, non-legal factors.10 When judges rule based on
their personal values, their decisions subvert litigants’ legal rights and

8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 33 (2d ed. 2007) (“Every person who appears in court expects to receive a determination of his case based on the merits of the case—rather
than on extrinsic circumstances.”).
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amount to a miscarriage of actual justice.11 Judges must therefore interpret and apply the law without regard for personal preferences or
value judgments;12 they must decide each case impartially, preserving
our justice system as one “of laws and not of men.”13 Disqualification
law attempts to protect litigants’ legal dues from biased rulings by
removing judges from cases that implicate their personal preferences.14 Thus, the goal of judicial “impartiality is not an end in itself.
It is an instrumental value designed to preserve a different end altogether: the rule of law. . . . [T]he ultimate goal is to enable judges . . .
to resolve disputes between parties on a case-by-case basis according
to the applicable facts and law . . . .”15
In addition to protecting litigants’ rights from actual injustice, disqualification law seeks to promote confidence in the court system by
avoiding even the appearance of judicial injustice. The efficacy of our
courts depends on society’s willingness to submit disputes to them
and accept their rulings.16 If the public perceives the justice system as

11. Recusal law promotes actual justice by ensuring that judicial rulings are based
on the rule of law and not on judges’ personal preferences, but also concentrates on
maintaining the appearance of justice. See generally Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit
of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007). This focus on appearances—sometimes
to the neglect of reality—engenders criticism of disqualification jurisprudence. See
infra notes 279–282 and accompanying text.
12. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble, cl. 1 (2007) [hereinafter
ABA CODE] (“An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our
system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of
integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”).
13. JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS 84 (1819); see LARRY
ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 11–25 (2001); LON. R. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964); see also Norman L. Greene, How Great Is Ameri-

ca’s Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court’s Decisions in
Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and Their
Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 884–85
(2010) (“The lack of bias is a ‘cardinal principle of justice’ and an ‘indispensible feature of democracy.’”).
14. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 33 (“Every person who appears in court expects
to receive a determination of his case based on the merits of the case—rather than on
extrinsic circumstances—and there is no question that the right to a fair trial includes
the right to be tried by an impartial and unbiased judge.”); id. at 53–54 (“[A] party
has the right to have her case heard and decided by a judge who is . . . disinterested,
dispassionate, and can approach the facts in an objective and impartial manner.”).
15. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 65
(2003).
16. See Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial
Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1970) (“Possessed of neither purse nor
sword, [the judiciary] depends primarily on the willingness of members of society to
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corrupted by biased judges deciding cases based on their personal
preferences, “the moral authority of the courts is critically undermined,”17 hampering their effectiveness. Judges must therefore not
only be, but must also appear to be unbiased.18 The Supreme Court
recognized this principle in Offutt v. United States, noting that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”19 Modern recusal jurisprudence addresses this concern by disqualifying judges not only
when they are biased, but even when they merely appear partial.20
This heavy focus on eradicating bias is a relatively new development in recusal jurisprudence. At common law, judges were only disqualified for being a party to a case by virtue of their having some interest in the outcome,21 and early American recusal law tracked this
follow its mandates.” (citing Simon E. Sobeloff, Striving for Impartiality in the Federal Courts, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 286, 286 (1964))).
17. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 7 (1974).
18. United States v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974) (referring to apparent impartiality as “the palladium of our judicial system”); see also
State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435, 452 (Kan. 1996) (“It is vital to the legal system that
the public perceive the system as impartial.”); Baier v. Hampton, 440 N.W.2d 712,
715 (N.D. 1989) (“[The court’s] primary concern is the preservation of public respect
and confidence in the integrity of the judicial system . . . .”).
19. 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see also Barker v. Sec’y of State’s Office of Mo., 752
S.W.2d 437, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“One of the fundamental precepts which govern the sound administration of justice is that . . . an appearance of justice must be
maintained.”).
20. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (“[The] overriding concern with appearances, which
also pervades the Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in
which the public has unwavering confidence.”); Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse nor

Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn from American Courts’ Struggle for Democratic
Legitimacy, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 653, 657 (2007) (“Public confidence is vital to
a well-functioning judiciary, so regardless of whether actual bias exists, the appearance can be sufficient to remove a judge from a particular case.”). See generally
FLAMM, supra note 10, at 108–13.
21. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (quoting
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges,
56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947) (“The common law of disqualification . . . was clear and
simple: a judge was disqualified for a direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else.”);
Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safe Guarding the Litigants Constitutional Right to a

Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising From
Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 387–88
(1987). Some sources indicate that this description of common law disqualification
doctrine is overly restrictive, and that Lord Coke’s maxim that “no man may be a
judge in his own case,” 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 141a
(1628) (“[A]liquis non debet esse judex in propria causa.”), was actually understood
to include a broader array of circumstances implicating judges’ impartiality. See Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s Opinion in
City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994) (arguing that Coke’s maxim
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English doctrine.22 In the early twentieth century, however, perhaps
in response to changing perceptions and new problems related to judicial impartiality, new legislative initiatives began to focus disqualification practice on actual and apparent judicial bias.23 Recusals are

and the common law doctrine was broadly based in natural law jurisprudence and
classical liberal political theory). For example, Lord Bracton followed Roman precedent in disqualifying judges on the mere suspicion of bias. See 6 BRACTON, LEGIBUS
ET CONSUETUNDINIBUS ANGLIE 249 (Twiss ed. 1883) (“[T]he only cause for recusal is
a suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the
plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his
kinsman or his pleader in that cause or another, and in any such like capacity.”);
CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, Codex, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16 translated in Harrington Puttman,
Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923) (“[B]ecause it is our pleasure that all
litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks
the judge under suspicion to recuse him before issue joined”). Some cases support
Bracton’s broad view of common law recusal. See, e.g., City of London v. Wood,
(1702) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B.); see also GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL 11–
13 (2009) (recognizing that at common law, judges were disqualified for being party
to a case even if they lacked pecuniary interests in the outcome); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 813, 839 n.75 (2009). Blackstone, supported by several prior cases, rejected
Bracton’s approach. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 361 (1765–1769) (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor
in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. And should the fact at any time
prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of the law will not presume beforehand, there is
no doubt but that such misbehavior would draw down a heavy censure from those to
whom the judge is accountable for his conduct.”); see also Between the Parishes of
Great Charte v. Kennington, (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B.) (disqualifying judges
from deciding a case involving the removal of a pauper that the judges’ home county
was otherwise obligated to financially support); The Case of Foxham in Com. Wilts,
(1706) 91 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B.) (disqualifying judge who held another public office
that was the subject of the case); Anonymous, (1698) 91 ENG. REP. 343 (K.B.) (laying
“by the heels” the Mayor of Hereford for presiding over an ejectment action involving one of his own tenants); Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608) (disqualifying physician review board from assessing fines against unlicensed practitioners because the fines were received by the members of the board).
22. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1994); Edward G. Burg,
Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1445, 1480–81 (1981); Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the
Federal Judicial Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 754 (2010);
Stempel, supra note 21, at 841 (“The English view . . . was largely incorporated by the
colonial and subsequent American legal system of the eighteenth century.”). For examples of early American disqualification laws, see An Act for Regulating Processes
in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations for the Officers of
the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278 (1792) [hereinafter 1792 Act]; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, § 7.
23. See generally Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance
of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is what the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914
(2010).
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currently governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455,24 by the American
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct,25 which has been
adopted in some form by forty-nine States,26 and by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.27

2.

Grounds for Disqualification in American Law

Judges may be removed in a variety of circumstances, including
where they have a financial stake in a case, are closely related to parties or attorneys, accept bribes or gifts from parties or attorneys, or
have extra-judicial knowledge about a case. These substantive
grounds for removal are not disqualifying per se; they are indicia of
actual or apparent judicial misconduct.28 As Professor Leubsdorf
notes, “disqualification law is clearly directed at the likelihood of
warped judgment, with a judge’s financial interest or familial stake in
the case as just one circumstance from which to infer such a likelihood.”29 Thus, in Tumey v. Ohio,30 the Supreme Court disqualified a

24. The first federal disqualification statute was passed in 1792. See 1792 Act, supra note 22. This law remained in effect without significant changes until Congress
passed sections 20 and 21 of the Judicial Code, which greatly expanded the grounds
for disqualifying Federal judges. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090.
These provisions were slightly revised in 1948, and were then recodified as 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144, 455. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch.139, §65, 63 Stat. 99; Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908. Congress overhauled the law in 1974 to bring it into harmony
with the ABA Cannons, which were far more stringent than the Federal requirements then in force. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609; see
also Susan E. Barton, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintaining an Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 863, 868
(1978) (noting that under the pre-1974 federal statutes “federal judges were governed
by disparate ethical and statutory standards”). For a general discussion of the history
of federal disqualification rules see FLAMM, supra note 10, at 669–750; Flamm, supra
note 22, at 753–59.
25. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.11. The original ABA Cannons of Judicial
Conduct were issued in 1924, perhaps in response to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis’s serving as both a federal judge and the first commissioner of Major League
Baseball. The ABA standards were revised in 1972 and 1990, and the current version
was adopted in 2007. See generally McKoski, supra note 23, at 1921–36 (2010).
26. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding when a
Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
55, 55 (2000).
27. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 30–39; see also infra Part I.A.2.f.
28. See Burg, supra note 22, at 1480–82; Note, Disqualification of a Judge on the
Ground of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1927); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
29. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 237, 247 (1987).
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town mayor from serving as a municipal judge, in part, because he
would receive additional compensation only if he convicted the defendants appearing before him. The Court did not find that the
mayor’s obvious interest in the outcome of each case was disqualifying per se. Instead, the Court disqualified the mayor because his interest threatened his impartiality, making it unlikely that he would be
able to “hold the balance nice, clear, and true.”31
This Section reviews the substantive grounds for disqualification,
which the law considers indicative of actual or apparent judicial bias.
Section I.A.2.a. considers disqualification based on a judge’s manifesting actual or apparent bias. Section I.A.2.a. discusses when judges
might be disqualified for a bias resulting from a financial interest in a
case; Section I.A.2.c. for a familial relationship to litigants or attorneys; Section I.A.2.d. for accepting bribes or gifts from parties appearing in court; and Section I.A.2.e. for possessing extra-judicial
knowledge about a case.

a.

Bias and the Appearance of Bias

A judge’s impartiality is the most “fundamental” and “self-evident”
ground for a fair judicial system.32 In practice, however, it is more difficult to directly remove a judge for bias than it is to disqualify a judge
on other substantive grounds like financial interest, which merely indicate potential partiality. This is because whereas removal for external indications of possible bias relies on objectively observable
facts, direct disqualification for bias “is focused on the mental attitude
or disposition of the judge toward a party to the litigation,”33 which is
often not objectively demonstrable.34 In light of the difficulties involved in correctly evaluating judges’ subjective states of mind, challenged judges are presumed to be impartial.35 To remove an allegedly
biased judge, a party must overcome this presumption by demonstrat30. 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
31. Id.
32. Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 662 (1984).
33. Freeman v. State, 757 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
34. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 56 (“[B]ias is ordinarily not an empirically provable fact. It is, rather, a shorthand way of referring to the ‘attitude’ or ‘state of mind’
of a judge who cannot be trusted to act in a detached and impartial manner.”).
35. See Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The general
presumption is that judges are honest, upright individuals and thus that they rise
above biasing influences.”); State v. DeGroff, No. 30758-8-II, 2005 WL 1540810, at *8
(Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 2005) (“A judge is presumed to perform his functions regularly and properly, without bias or prejudice.”).

PILL_CHRISTENSEN

520

5/10/2012 12:43 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

ing that the judge manifested a predisposition for or against a party or
an attorney.36
Sections 144 and 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code offer
two avenues for removing a biased judge. Section 144, the “Peremptory Disqualification Statute,” protects litigants from actually biased
rulings by disqualifying judges that have “a personal bias or prejudice
either against [the movant] or in favor of any adverse party.”37 Judges challenged under section 144 must accept the facts alleged in a section 144 affidavit as true,38 and may consider only whether those facts
are sufficient to reasonably suggest the presence of bias.39 In deciding
section 144 motions, judges consider whether the facts are stated with
peculiarity, whether they would convince a reasonable person that the
judge is actually biased,40 and whether they are factual allegations or
merely opinions or conclusions.41
Section 455(a) goes further to preserve public confidence in the
courts by disqualifying judges that merely appear biased.42 Under
section 455, a judge is disqualified when a party demonstrates that a

36. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.3 cmt. 2 (“[M]anifestations of bias . . . include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and
irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and
others an appearance of bias or prejudice.”).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 582 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] district
judge faced with a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144, must accept the
allegations of the moving party as true.”); Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l., Inc., 832 F.2d
1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Under § 144, the judge cannot assess the truth of the
facts alleged.”).
39. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 692–94.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Ala. State Univ. v. Auburn Univ., 487
U.S. 1210 (1988).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1340 (3d Cir. 1989).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”); see Arocena v. United States, 721 F. Supp. 528,
530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The purpose of section 455(a) is to promote confidence in the
judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.” (citing Hardy v. United
States, 878 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir.
1995) (“Because we seek to protect the public’s confidence in the judiciary, our inquiry focuses not on whether the judge actually harbored subjective bias, but rather
on whether the record, viewed objectively, reasonably supports the appearance of
prejudice or bias.”). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 108–13.
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reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality;43 the movant need not show or even allege actual bias on the part of the challenged judge.44 When deciding section 455(a) motions, courts ask
whether a reasonable person aware of all the relevant facts, without
knowing whether the challenged judge is actually biased, would question the judge’s impartiality.45

b.

Financial Interest

American disqualification law maintains the common law proscription against judges presiding over cases in which they have a pecuniary interest because “no man may be a judge in his own case.”46 Section 455 provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself whenever
he . . . knows that he . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”47 The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.4 similarly cautions that “[a] judge shall not permit . . . financial, or other interests or
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”48

43. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 493
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Recusal is required when ‘a reasonable and informed observer
would question the judge’s impartiality.’”(citation omitted)).
44. See Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 327 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]ctual bias is not
a requisite element under § 455(a).”).
45. See Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[The question is whether] ‘a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the circumstances
involved, would have questions or doubts as to the impartiality of the trial
judge.’”(citation omitted)); United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]e ask: ‘[w]ould a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned?’”(second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Union Carbide Corp. v.
U.S. Cutting Servs., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he issue is whether
‘an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt that justice
would be done in the case.’” (quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460
(7th Cir. 1985))); State v. Perala, 130 P.3d 852, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); In re
Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 583 (Pa. 1992); see also McKoski, supra note 23, at 1944–45.
46. 1 COKE, supra note 21, at 141a; see Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences,
95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1044 (2007) (“One of the most fundamental precepts of due process is that no man can be a judge in his own case . . . .”). For a more extensive discussion of common law disqualification, see supra note 21.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006).
48. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.4. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at
145–68.
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While at common law a judge’s financial interest in a case was per
se disqualifying,49 under the current approach, a judge’s pecuniary interest in a case is a proxy for judicial bias.50 As Rule 2.4 of the ABA
Model Code indicates, the law is concerned that financially interested
judges will partially decide cases in favor of those interests.51 The Supreme Court confirmed this rationale when it held in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co. that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”52
Courts generally agree that a judge’s interest in a case need not be
particularly large53 or directly affected by the outcome of the litigation to be disqualifying.54 Beyond this, how courts should determine
whether a particular judge’s interest in a case is disqualifying is “the
source of much disagreement.”55 Some decisions follow a categorical
approach, holding that a judge is disqualified for any non-negligible
pecuniary interest.56 Others focus on whether the judge’s interest in

49. See supra note 21.
50. See Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 247 (“Today, disqualification law is clearly
directed at the likelihood of warped judgment, with a judge’s financial interest or familial stake in the case as just one circumstance from which to infer such a likelihood.”); see also Burg, supra note 22, at 1480–82; Note, supra note 28, at 79–80.
51. See Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (“[T]he lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore judges
ought to be prohibited from presiding over cases in whose outcomes they have a direct financial interest.”).
52. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
53. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (disqualifying a judge from
issuing a search warrant where the judge was paid a five dollar fee for each warrant
issued, but received nothing for warrant applications that he denied); Haas v. County
of San Bernardino, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 358–59 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[The majority] implies that a due process violation
would arise from payment of even $10 . . . an amount that today would not cover a
hearing officer’s parking in many cities.”).
54. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (disqualifying a
judge from ruling on an appeal from a punitive damage award where the issue to be
decided bore on another pending litigation in which the judge was a plaintiff); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1994) (“An indirect financial interest in the claim raises a question of impartiality.”). But see In re
Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954
F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)) (“Where a case . . . involves remote, contingent, indirect,
or speculative interests, disqualification is not required.”).
55. Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1991).
56. See, e.g., In re N.M. Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir.
1980) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 455, direct financial interests are governed by a
per se rule); In re Estate of Sherburne, 476 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1984) (“[T]he nature
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the case is substantial, either in terms of his personal finances, or in
terms of the total value of the case.57 Still, other cases consider
whether the judge’s interest, however small, stands to be significantly
impacted by the outcome of the case.58 The general governing principle seems to be that a “judge should not act in any matter in which he
has any interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party to that matter.”59

c.

Familial Relationships

Disqualifying judges for a familial relationship with a party is a logical extension of the financial interest proscription and the principle
that one cannot judge his own case.60 Just as judges may not remain
impartial when deciding cases implicating their financial interests, jurists who are closely related to litigants will likely rule from bias rather than legal principle.61 Section 455 disqualifies a judge where “a
person within the third degree of relationship to [the judge]: (i) [i]s a
party to the proceeding . . . (ii) [i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; [or] (iii) [i]s known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”62 The ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct similarly instructs that “[a] judge shall not
permit family . . . relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”63

of the interest required . . . is . . . a pecuniary or property right from which the judge
might profit or lose.”).
57. See, e.g., Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n., 344 Ark.
274, 283 (2001) (considering whether the judge’s interest is sufficiently significant to
create a reasonable concern that it would lead him to decide the case without the
requisite impartiality and integrity).
58. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (2006) (disqualifying judges that “have an
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”).
59. FLAMM, supra note 10, at 149.
60. See id. at 169–70; Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts
and the Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381, 385 (1990).
61. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 839 F.2d 1226, 1229
(7th Cir. 1988) (stating that “[a] $50 gift from Continental to Judge Shadur would
disqualify him; a $5,000 gift from Continental to Robert Shadur [the judge’s son]
could be worth more than $50 to Judge Shadu”); Georgia Power Co. v. Watts, 190
S.E. 654, 659 (Ga. 1937) (disqualifying a judge who was related to a stockholder in
the corporate party, even though the judge’s relative was merely interested in the
outcome of the case, but was not an actual party).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).
63. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.4(B).
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Disqualification for a familial relationship is governed by a twopart standard. First, the movant must demonstrate that the judge has
a sufficiently close relationship to an interested party.64 The closeness
of judge-party relationships is typically described by statute in terms
of “degrees” of relation.65 Judges related to parties in the statutorily
provided degree or closer may be disqualified, while more distantly
related judges may preside. Most jurisdictions calculate degrees of
relation by tracing the judge and interested party’s lineage to a common ancestor, and then counting the generations back down to the
judge or party.66 Each generation by which the judge or interested
party are removed from their common ancestor constitutes one degree of relation.67 Thus, brothers are first degree relations, a father
and son, second degree, and uncle and nephew, third degree.68 After
establishing a close relationship between a judge and party, a movant
must show that the related party’s interest in the case is substantial
enough to warrant the judge’s removal.69

d.

Bribes and Gifts

Judges who accept bribes or gifts from parties are disqualified because they may be biased in favor of the party who gave the gift.70
The ABA Code therefore provides that “[a] judge shall not accept
any gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value, if ac64. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 171.
65. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (third degree); Ala. Code § 12-1-12 (1975)
(fourth degree); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 170.1 (West 2010) (same); La. Code Civ. Pro.
art. 151 (1999) (same); Mont. Code Ann. § 3-1-803 (third degree); N.Y. JUD. LAW §
14 (McKinney 2001) (sixth degree); Wis. Stat. Ann. 757.19(2) (West 2001) (same).
66. See Morton v. Benton Pub. Co., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 824 (Ark. 1987); State v.
Daughtery, 563 So.2d 1171, 1175 (La. App. 1990).
67. See William W. Kilgarlin & Jennifer Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of
Judges, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 599, 604 (1986). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at
173–75.
68. Some jurisdictions distinguish between blood-relations (relations by consanguinity) and relations through marriage (relations by affinity), holding that a judge’s
relationship to a party through marriage is not disqualifying. See, e.g., Wernowsky v.
Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 461 N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (refusing to disqualify
a judge from cases involving his brother-in-law); State v. Fullerton, 684 S.W.2d 59, 62
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (judge’s daughter’s marriage to prosecutor’s brother does not
disqualify the judge from cases tried by that prosecutor because they do not share a
common ancestor).
69. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 171.
70. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997) (“A judge who accepts bribes from a criminal defendant to fix that defendant’s case is ‘biased’ in the
most basic sense of that word.”); Cartalino v. Washington, 122 F.3d 8, 11 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[A] bribed judge is biased per se.”).
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ceptance . . . would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the
judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”71 A judge is not only disqualified for receiving gifts from a party to a case then pending
before him, but also for having accepted a gift from someone who later becomes involved in litigation before the judge, or for taking a gift
from someone that is not party to any case before the judge.72
Judges’ accepting valuable gifts may result in bias, but their accepting “mere social hospitality” does not raise concerns about their impartiality, and does not typically warrant removal.73 In deciding
whether a particular gift is valuable or just an ordinary social convention, courts consider the monetary value of the gift, the relationship
between the judge and giver, and local social practices related to giftgiving.74 As with financial interests and familial relationships, the test
is not a categorical one; the question is whether the nature of the gift
raises concerns that the judge will fail to decide the case with complete impartiality.75
Bias arising from judges’ receiving gifts raises concerns about judges’ receiving judicial election campaign contributions.76 The ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct explains:
71. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 3.13(A).
72. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 352 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (disqualifying a judge appointed by Governor George Wallace from hearing subsequent divorce proceedings between Wallace and his wife); State v. Hodges, 305 S.E.2d 278
(W. Va. 1983) (judge’s accepting gifts from a jury and other court personnel created
an appearance of bias). But see In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 205 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[F]ederal judges routinely receive free copies of books, journals, magazines, and
other publications that discuss disputed policy issues without any imputation . . . that,
if they read some of the unsolicited materials, they are thereafter recused on any matter connected with those issues.”).
73. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 3.13(B)(3).
74. See Charles F. Scott, Reconciling Conflicts in Illinois Judicial Ethics, 19 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1067, 1069 (1988).
75. See id. at 1072–73.
76. See Keith Anderson, Ethical Problems of Lawyers and Judges in Election
Campaigns, 50 A.B.A. J. 819, 823 (1964) (“As long as a judge’s campaign committee
must accept gifts of money and work from lawyers, there will be gnawing doubts as to
the freedom from influence and bias.”); Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a
Good Politician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV.
433, 494 (2005) (“If the judge felt beholden to particular supporters for their gifts,
and believed that he was morally obliged to rule in their favor (i.e., to exercise favoritism) whenever they appeared before him, we would accuse him of bias or partiality.”). For general discussions of problems arising from judicial elections, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and
Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003); Leona C.
Smoler & Mary A. Stokinger, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Of-
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[A] judge plays a role different from that of a legislator or executive
branch official. Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, . . .
judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible,
be free and appear to be free from political influence and political
pressure.77

Recognizing the prevalence of elected judiciaries78 and the need to
finance judicial election campaigns, the law permits judges to receive
“reasonable donations” in support of their candidacies.79 The ABA
Model Code suggests merely that legislatures set a reasonable monetary value beyond which contributions to a judicial campaign would
appear inappropriate.80 The Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co.,81 where, relying on the Due Process Clause,
the Court disqualified a state high court judge from deciding a case
where one party’s CEO had spent three million dollars supporting the
judge’s election,82 placed some “outer boundaries” on judges’ ability
fice: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1986); Jon R. Waltz, Some
Firsthand Observations on the Election of Judges, 63 JUDICATURE 185 (1979); Stuart
Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988); Grannis, supra note 21.
77. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
78. See State Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.
brennancenter.org/content/section/category/ state_judicial_elections (last visited Feb.
21, 2012) (“Thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges”).
79. See Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685, 687–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[A] reasonable person must . . . know that our judges have to stand for election on
a regular basis, that elections cost money, and that money must be raised to conduct
an effective campaign . . . to require a sitting justice to recuse, something more than
the mere fact that . . . she prevailed in a contested election and that contributions
were received must be shown.”); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 245–46 (“[C]ourts have
generally accepted that as long as a state chooses to select its judges by means of
popular elections, the judiciary must condone to some extent the collection and expenditure of money for judicial election campaigns.”).
80. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 4.4. Under the ABA Code, however, contributions cannot be solicited by or given to the judicial candidate directly. Rather,
solicitations and contributions must be funneled through a campaign committee
which serves to insulate the candidate from his contributors. See id., R. 4.2(B), 4.4 &
cmt. 1; FLAMM, supra note 10, at 247; see also Mackenzie v. Super Kids Bargain
Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (Fla. 1990) (“[Requiring judicial candidates to solicit campaign contributions through a campaign committee] insulates, to the extent
possible, justices, judges, and judicial candidates from those asked to make contributions to the campaign. This insulation of judges and judicial candidates reduces the
possibility of a quid pro quo relationship and serves to avoid the appearance of impropriety.”).
81. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
82. See id. at 2257–64.
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to decide cases involving their own campaign contributors.83
Caperton’s full impact remains to be seen, however, since the decision
rested on extreme facts and the Court emphasized that less troubling
circumstances might not require the judge’s removal.84

e.

Prior Knowledge

Judges are disqualified for having extrajudicial knowledge about a
case because special insight into the facts of a case may prevent them
from impartially weighing parties’ evidence and arguments.85 Federal
law disqualifies a judge who has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”86 The ABA Model Code
similarly provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in
any proceeding in which . . . [t]he judge has . . . personal knowledge of
facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.”87 Judges are not disqualified, however, where their knowledge about a case is generally available to the public88 or is the product of judicial proceedings89 because
83. Id. at 2267 (“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications.”(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828
(1986))).
84. Id. at 2265–66 (“In each [previous recusal] case the Court dealt with extreme
facts that created an unconstitutional probability of bias that ‘cannot be defined with
precision.’ Yet . . . [t]he Court was careful to distinguish the extreme facts of the cases before it from those interests that would not rise to a constitutional level.” (citation omitted)). For discussions of the potential impact of Caperton on disqualification for judges’ accepting campaign contributions, see Bruce A. Green, Fear of the
Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229 (2010); James
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293
(2010); James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 787 (2010) (noting responses related to funding judicial elections in some states
following the Caperton decision).
85. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–39 (1955) (disqualifying a judge from
presiding over contempt proceedings against defendants arising from their conduct in
one-man grand jury proceedings held by the same judge because the judge could not
free himself from influence of personal knowledge of what occurred in the grand jury
session); United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 102–03 (1st Cir. 2001); Edgar v. K.L.,
93 F.3d 256, 259–62 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); cf. Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d
1323, 1340 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sidener, 876 F.2d 1334, 1336 (7th Cir.
1989) (judge’s impartiality not reasonably questioned when judge had some prior knowledge about the case because the movant did not present any evidence of impartiality arising from that knowledge).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006).
87. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.11.
88. See State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 247 (Minn. 2005) (“‘[P]ersonal
knowledge’ pertains to knowledge that arises out of a judge’s private, individual connection to particular facts. . . . [I]t does not include the vast realm of general
knowledge that a judge acquires in her day-to-day life as a judge and citizen.”); see
also United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327, 1330 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] judge should
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such information is considered conducive to good judicial decision
making.90

f.

The Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause protects people from being deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.91 In part, “[t]he
Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal,” so that his life, liberty, or property will not be taken based
on a judge’s biased or incorrect understanding of the law or facts.92
Due Process also “assures equal application of the law,” and guarantees “that the judge who hears [each litigant’s] case will apply the law
to him in the same way he applies it to any other party.”93
While “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not
rise to a constitutional level,”94 the Supreme Court has found that in
some circumstances Due Process does mandate a judge’s removal.95
Judges are constitutionally disqualified when their pecuniary interest
in a case would “offer a possible temptation to the average man . . .
never be reluctant to inform himself on a general subject matter area, or participate
in conferences relative to any area for the law, for fear that the sources of information might later be assailed as ‘one sided.’”).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
judge was not disqualified from presiding over a case despite his concurrently presiding over a related action because the judge’s knowledge about the matter came from
a judicial, not extrajudicial, source); United States v. Flowers, 818 F.2d 464, 468–69
(6th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Canons of Judicial Conduct did not require the district judge to recuse due to his personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts because the information did not come from an extrajudicial source).
90. See generally Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548–53 (1994).
91. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
92. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
93. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002); see also Bigby
v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he cornerstone of the American judicial system is the right to a fair and impartial process. Therefore, any judicial officer incapable of presiding in such a manner violates the due process rights of the
party who suffers the resulting effects of that judicial officer’s bias.”). See generally
Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 661, 668–69 (2010).
94. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).
95. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 31–33; Terri R. Day, Buying Justice:
Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due Process,
28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 366–70 (2009); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification
in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247,
249–55 (2010); Grannis, supra note 21, at 391–96; Benjamin A. Levin, Note,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: Something is Rotten in the State of West Virginia—A Common-Law Approach to Constitutional Judicial Disqualification, 69 MD. L.
REV. 637, 640–53 (2010).
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not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”96 A judge who becomes
heavily involved with the parties or subject matter of a case may also
be constitutionally disqualified. For example, in In re Murchison97
the Court held a judge may not preside over the criminal prosecution
of a defendant that the judge had indicted while serving as a one-man
grand jury.98 Similarly, in Offutt v. United States,99 the Court ruled a
judge was constitutionally disqualified from a case being tried by an
attorney who leveled “personal attacks or innuendoes” against the
judge.100
Most recently, the Court expanded constitutional disqualification
by holding that Justice Brett Benjamin was disqualified from hearing
an appeal where the appellant’s CEO had spent three million dollars
to support Benjamin’s election to the bench several years earlier.101
Caperton established that Due Process does not “require proof of actual bias,”102 and that the relevant question is whether the circumstances pose “such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
96. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); see Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827–29 (1986) (constitutionally disqualifying a state appellate
judge from an appeal because the judge was a party to pending litigation that turned
on one of the questions presented to the appellate court for review); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (“[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”); see also
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579–81 (1973) (constitutionally disqualifying a state
optometry board composed solely of members of one professional association from
license revocation proceedings brought against optometrists employed by a competing optometry association).
97. 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955).
98. Id. at 137 (“It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to
act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his investigations. . . . A single ‘judge-grand jury’ is even more a part of the accusatory process
than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process a judge cannot
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of
those accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal. Fair trials are too important a
part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they
prefer.”). But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54–55 (1975) (holding an administrative agency tasked with licensing physicians is not disqualified from adjudicating
license-revocation proceedings simply because it also investigates claims of physician
misconduct and initiates such proceedings itself).
99. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
100. Id. at 14; see also Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
101. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257–59 (2009); see
also supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
102. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
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adequately implemented.”103 Reasoning that “fears of bias arise
when . . . a man chooses the judge in his own cause,”104 the Court concluded that Justice Benjamin would feel a debt of gratitude to the appellant’s CEO for the latter’s extraordinary efforts on behalf of his
election campaign, and that his presiding over the case would therefore lead to a “possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true.”105
B.

The Traditional Jewish Law of Judicial Disqualification and
Recusal

This Section reviews the traditional Jewish law approach to judicial
disqualification. Because halachic disqualification jurisprudence is
grounded in the Jewish law’s unique conception of the role of courts
and judges in the litigation process, Section I.B.1. begins by providing
appropriate jurisprudential context for the substance of Jewish
recusal doctrine. Building on this theoretical framework, Section
I.B.2 lays out the basic doctrines governing judges’ removal in the
halachic system.

1.

Litigation, Courts, and Judges in the Halachic System: The
Jurisprudential Aims of Jewish Disqualification Law

Halachic recusal law serves principally to preserve the integrity of
courts’ institutional role in the adjudicative process, to protect judges’
professional integrity, and to encourage judges to be personally
integrious. Courts’ institutional role and judges’ professional and
personal duties stem, in turn, from the Torah law’s goal of encouraging the moral ennoblement of mankind through other-focused selftranscendence.
Jewish tradition characterizes God as performing chessed, selfless
actions calculated to impart good unto others.106 God expressed His
characteristic chessed by creating Man “in His own image,”107 by en103. Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
104. Id. at 2265.
105. Id. at 2262–64 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
106. See AVOS D’RAV NOSSON 4:5 (“The world was initially created with nothing
but chessed, as it says, For I [God] have said: The world will be built with chessed.”)
(internal quotations omitted); R. MOSHE CHAIM LUZZATTO (1707–1746), 1 DERECH
HASHEM 2:1 (“Behold, the very purpose of [God’s] creating [the world] was to confer
from His goodness unto his creations.”). All translations of Hebrew-language
sources in this Note are my own unless otherwise indicated.
107. Genesis 1:27; cf. R. ELIYAHU DESSLER, 1 MICHTAV M’ELIYAHU 32 (1997)
(quoting Genesis 1:27) (“The power of giving is the greatest of God’s characteristics .
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dowing him with God-like creativity and free will,108 and by directing
him to use these abilities to harness the natural world as a means of
performing chessed himself.109 God fashioned a chessed-based universe to benefit His creations,110 and Man can emulate God by choosing to utilize his own creative potential to do chessed for others,111
thereby becoming truly human.112 The Talmud thus teaches that by
suppressing his natural self-centeredness and instead using his talents
for chessed in accordance with God’s will Man becomes “a partner
with God in the ongoing work of Creation.”113

. . and with this characteristic He created Man, as it says: ‘In God’s image was Man
created . . . .’”).
108. See R. CHIZKIYAH B. MANOACH (d. 13th century), CHEZKUNI, GENESIS 1:26
(s.v. Na’aseh Adam) (explaining that just as God controls the heavens, so too, is Man
empowered to rule over the earth); R. OVADIAH SFORNO (d. 1550), COMMENTARY ON
THE PENTATEUCH, GENESIS 1:27 (s.v. B’tzelem Elohim) (reasoning that Man’s likeness to God lies in his ability to exercise free-will to choose between good and evil).
109. See Genesis 1:28; Genesis 2:15 (“And God set a goal for [Adam and Eve], and
God said to them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and conquer it . . . And
God took Man and place and set him in the Garden of Eden to develop and guard
it.”); NACHMANIDES (1194–1270), COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH, GENESIS 1:28
(s.v. v’kivshuha); see also R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, THE NINETEEN LETTERS 62
(Joseph Elias, trans., 2d. ed. 1995) (“God created [Man] . . . to be, so to speak, a
‘partner in the work of creation,’ able to direct the forces that make up our world and
free to choose how to use this power.” (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS
10a)).
110. See supra note 106.
111. HIRSCH, supra note 109, at 64 (“Since God’s world is built . . . on loving kindness, man’s duty to follow God and imitate His ways is discharged, in the first place,
by doing acts of kindness.”).
112. See R. YEHUDAH LOEW (1525–1609), DERECH CHAIM 2:1 (stating that Man
makes himself truly human by choosing to govern himself with his intellect and
awareness of his God-given purpose instead of with his base physicality); R. SAMSON
RAPHAEL HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND OBSERVANCES 247–
48 (Dayan Dr. Isidore Grunfeld, transl., 7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HIRSCH, HOREB]
(“[T]he highest goal you can reach is to become a chasid, that is to say, a person who
lives entirely, with everything he has, for the welfare of others, who is nothing for
himself and everything for others.”); Dayan Dr. Isidore Grunfeld, Introduction, in
HOREB, supra, at p. xliii [hereinafter Grunfeld, Introduction] (“[To perfect the world
through the reign of God]—this is the aim, the striving for which makes us into pious
souls.” (quoting R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 3 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 449 (1912)
(Ger.))).
113. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 10a; see Michael J. Broyde, Rights and Duties in the Jewish Tradition, in CONTRASTS IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW xxix
(Daniel Pollack ed., 2001) (“[Jewish law] is predicated on the duty to imitate the Divine”); see also BABYLONAIN TALMUD, SHABBOS 133b (“Just as God is merciful and
gracious, so should you act mercifully and graciously.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
SOTAH 14a; MAIMONIDES (1135–1204), SEFER HAMITZVOS, Positive Commandment
8. See generally R. MOSHE CORDOVERO (1522–1570), TOMER DEVORAH, ch. 5–6
(discussing Man’s duty to emulate God’s characteristics).
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Torah law, which governs individual, communal, and national Jewish life,114 teaches Jews how to fulfill this chessed-imperative in practice.115 Jews fulfill their imitatio dei obligation by transcending their
baser instincts and choosing to act in accordance with the Torah’s
chessed-oriented legal norms instead.116 The Jewish law system thus
functions primarily as a means of enabling its adherents to develop
their humaneness through self-transcendence, by teaching them how
and instructing them to choose to adopt God’s chessed-focused will as
their own.117 The Midrash thus posits that “[t]he Torah’s laws were
given to the Jews for the sole purpose of refining their social interactions.”118

114. See Grunfeld, Introduction, supra note 112, at xlvii (“What the Torah desires
to regulate is . . . the whole of human existence—man’s sensual impulses, his needs
and desires, his individual life as well as that of his family, society, and State.” (quoting R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 1 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 83 (1912) (Ger.))).
115. See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 2 COLLECTED WRITINGS 207 (Marc Breur
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter HIRSCH, COLLECTED WRITINGS] (“The Law [of
the Torah] . . . establishes God’s will as the motive and measure of man’s ennoblement.”); HOREB, supra note 112, at 219–20 (“[God] has announced His justice to the
world [in the laws of the Torah] so that you may freely submit to Him in consequence
of His command to you . . . and so that you may be just.”); Steven H. Resnicoff, Autonomy in Jewish Law—In Theory and Practice, 24 J. L. & RELIGION 507, 508–09
(2008) (“Jewish law assumes that there is a God, that God is morally perfect, that
God wants human beings to act morally, and that God communicated to the Jewish
people specific and general moral rules (Torah precepts).”).
116. See LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY IN JUDAISM 8 (Michael Walzer ed., 2008)
(“If [man] could only fathom the inner intent of the law, he would realize that the essence of the true divine religion lies in the deeper meaning of its positive and negative precepts, every one of which will aid man in his striving after perfection . . . .”
(quoting MAIMONIDES, LETTER TO YEMEN); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and
Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J.
CONTEMP. L. I SSUES 1, 17 (1989) (“[The Jewish legal system] is based on the value of
encouraging individuals to expand their narrow self centeredness and reach out to a
level of consideration of others: self-transcendence as a key form of moral education.”); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 306 (1961).
117. This concept is illustrated by the following Mishnaic teaching. “R. Chanina b.
Akashia said: God, blessed be He, wanted to provide benefit to the Jews. He therefore gave them a multitude of Torah commandments, as it says: ‘For the sake of upholding His justness, God made his teachings [the laws of the Torah] numerous and
glorious.’” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, MAKKOS 23b (quoting ISAIAH 42:21). R. Shlomo
Yitzchaki, an eleventh century French scholar and author of the preeminent commentary on the Talmud explained that the multitude of halachic directives benefit
adherents to the Torah because they provide additional opportunities for man to
suppress his base desires and accept God’s will as his own. See R. SHLOMO
YITZCHAKI, RASHI to MAKKOS 23b (s.v. L’zakos es Yisrael) [hereinafter, YITZCHAKI,
RASHI].
118. MIDRASH RABAH, LEVITICUS 13:3.
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Moral ennoblement through self-transcendence requires otherreferentiality, the adoption of an externally-dictated rather than internally-devised value system. While the implementation of even an
objective standard of conduct necessitates subjective interpretation,
by reposing ultimate authority in some other, morally superior authority an individual can minimize the degree to which seemingly selftranscendent actions are really self-indulgent appeals to his own vanity. As a moralizing medium, therefore, the Torah relies more on the
process of Jews’ choosing to subjugate their naturally self-referential
instincts in favor of God’s own value judgments as revealed in the Torah.119 When one performs a good act because his own conscious dictates he do so, his conduct stems from self-referential instinct; when
he does that same act because it is commanded by an external moral
authority, however, the performance becomes a self-transcending,
moralizing act.120 The Talmud thus teaches, “one who is commanded
to act and acts is greater than one who acts similarly but of his own
accord,”121 and “[o]ne may do much or one may do little [in service of
God], it is all equal provided each one directs and orders his heart
with reference to Heaven.”122
Interpersonal disputes challenge the halacha’s other-referential
character and the Torah’s self-transcending, moralizing ideal. The
other-referential acceptance of Torah law in traditionally religious
matters governing Man’s relationship with God is unproblematic.
Jews study the halacha, transcend their base instincts by self-applying
the Torah’s chessed-focused laws to their lives, and consult their rabbis when they are unsure about what the law requires.123 The moral119. See Grunfeld, Introduction, supra note 112, at lxxvii (“If a person makes the
will of God his own will, and fights” his natural self-centered desires and impulses
“he develops his moral power although his action is not the consequence of his own
moral discernment and of a purpose recognized by himself. For moral power and
one’s own moral discernment do not depend on one another.” (quoting R. SAMSON
RAPHAEL HIRSCH, ERSTE MITTEILUNGEN 7 (1838) (Ger.))).
120. Aharon Lichtenstein, Communal Governance, Lay and Rabbinic: An Overview, in RABBINIC AND LAY COMMUNAL AUTHORITY 20 (Suzanne Last Stone &
Robert S. Hirt eds., 2006) (“[A]ction in response to the halakhic call is superior to the
same act voluntarily undertaken.”).
121. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, AVODA ZARA 3a.
122. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERACHOS 17a; see also MISHNA TORAH, The Laws of
Kings 8:11 [hereinafter MISHNA TORAH] (“It is essential that the . . . Laws be obeyed
as commandments of God and not as the result of man’s own speculative reasoning
and moral discernment.”).
123. See MARC D. ANGEL, LOVING TRUTH AND PEACE: THE GRAND RELIGIOUS
WORLDVIEW OF RABBI BENTZION UZIEL 83 (1999) (“One of the vital functions of the
rabbi was to serve as a posek, a decisor of Jewish law.”); JOSEPH S. OZAROWSKI, TO
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izing, other-referential acceptance of the halacha in interpersonal
conflicts is far more problematic. Disputing parties often reasonably
disagree about how to “halachicly” resolve their disagreement. Further, a solution adopting one party’s view would negate the intended
moralizing impact of halachic practice because such a resolution, even
if substantively correct, would be self-referential, grounded in base
instinct rather than a self-transcending, reasoned acceptance of God’s
will.
This problem is remedied through adjudicatory procedures whereby Jewish law courts, or batei din (singular: beis din), provide parties
with other-referential assessments of how their cases should be resolved under Torah law.124 Batei din hear and evaluate parties’
claims, investigate facts, deliberate, and issue rulings elucidating their
views of litigants’ Torah-based responsibilities.125 As adjudicatory institutions, Jewish law courts function as disinterested third-parties
that are able provide other-referential halachic rulings precisely beWALK IN GOD’S WAYS: JEWISH PASTORAL PERSPECTIVES ON ILLNESS AND BEREAVEMENT 54 (2004).
124. For an extensive explanation of the self-transcendence facilitating role of Jewish law courts, see R. Jospeh B. Soloveitchik, The Role of the Judge, in S HIRUREI
HARAV: A C ONSPECTUS OF THE PUBLIC LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK 81 (Joseph Epstein ed., 1974). This conception of the role of litigation in Jewish law finds support in the halachic doctrine of self-help. The Torah generally prohibits individuals from using self-help to resolve monetary disputes with
others. A party may, however, employ self-help to enforce his legal claims on another when it is legally and factually clear that the self-helper is in the right and that he
would certainly prevail if he resolved the matter in court. See generally R. YOSEF
KARO (1488–1575), SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 4:1 [hereinafter KARO,
SHULCHAN ARUCH]. This rule indicates that the general prohibition on self-help is
not grounded in the need to maintain social order by proscribing vigilantism, but is
instead premised on the fact that in most cases the facts and law are not entirely
clear, and that, therefore, neither parties’ self-interested view of its Torah obligations
under the circumstances is likely to be entirely other-referential and moralizing. Under such circumstances, self-help based on a party’s self-referential understanding of
the halacha would undermine the Torah’s moralizing purpose. When the facts and
law unavoidably support one disputant over the other, however, the party in the right
may enforce the law himself, because the obviousness of the result permits his act of
self-help to be other-referential and moralizing. The law of self-help thus suggests
that halachic adjudication serves to resolve legal disputes in a moralizing manner in
cases where each litigants’ position is a product of its self-interested interpretation of
the Torah, rather than servile acceptance of God’s value judgment. See SHIMON
ETTINGER & HANINA BEN-MENAHEM, SELECTED TOPICS IN JEWISH LAW: SELF-HELP
IN JEWISH LAW 15 (1988); Yedidya Dinari, Self Help in Jewish Law, 4 DINE ISRAEL
91 (1973).
125. See Silberg, supra note 116, at 306 (“[L]itigation in Jewish law was in the nature of a common request for clarification by people willing to perform their duty
once made known to them.”); Suzanne Last Stone, Judaism and Civil Society, in
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY IN JUDAISM, supra note 116, at 20.
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cause they are not parties to the cases they decide.126 From this vantage, batei din can deliver what litigants cannot furnish for themselves: an external, other-referential evaluation of what the halacha
requires in a particular dispute.127 Previously self-focused litigants
can consequently transcend their personal priorities by adopting a
court’s disinterested judgment as their own standard, thereby morally
ennobling their conduct consonant with Torah ideals. The Torah preserves this institutional arrangement by disqualifying judges whose
connection to a case is incompatible with the court’s third-party character. Judges who are in effect parties to a case—such as those who
are financially interested in the outcome or are related to a party128—
are legally incapable of proceeding in a judicial capacity and are disqualified because their connection to the matter prevents them from
rendering other-referential, moralizing halachic decisions.129 Such litigant-judges literally cease being jurists,130 and thus, any measures
they take under the guise of judicial proceedings are ex post void.131
126. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a; KARO, SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 124, at 7:9, 7:12, 37:1.
127. See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH,
DEUTERONOMY 1:17 (s.v. Ki Hamishpat L’Eilokim Hu) [hereinafter HIRSCH, COMMENTARY] (“In giving judgment [the judge] is engaged in God’s work. . . . [The Torah’s] [j]ustice shapes a humane way of life and gives it the form intended by the Creator at the Creation; for the whole purpose of man’s creation was so that he should
freely realize God’s Will, and only for this purpose did the Creator place man in His
world.”); see also Bush, supra note 117, at 17–18; Silberg, supra note 116, at 306.
128. See infra Part I.B.2.a.ii.; see also infra Part I.B.2.a.iii (disqualification for receiving bribes or gifts); Part I.B.2.a.iv. (disqualification for having previously issued
an advisory opinion).
129. See RASHI to BAVA BASRA 43a (s.v. Noga’im B’eidusan Hein). Rashi discusses financially interested witnesses who wish to testify on behalf of their interest,
writing that since “if any plaintiff were to collect a judgment against the [property in
question] they [the witnesses] would lose, it comes out that they would be testifying
in their own case.” Id. This comment, and other halachic discussions relating to witness disqualification, also applies to judicial recusal, because under Jewish law, judges
are disqualified in every instance where a similarly situated witness would be ineligible to testify. See MISHNAH, NIDDAH 6:4 (“All those disqualified from testifying are
disqualified from judging, but there are those that are disqualified from judging that
are nevertheless qualified to testify.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 27b; see
also supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.
130. See R. YONASAN EIBESHUTZ, TUMIN 37:1 and sources cited therein (reasoning
that a financially interested witness or judge cannot really be considered disqualified
because, on account of their stake in the case, they were never “within the legal definition of a witness” or judge).
131. See R. MOSHE ISSERELES (1520–1572), DARCHEI MOSHE [hereinafter
ISSERELES, DARCHEI MOSHE] to R. YOSEF KARO, BAIS YOSEF [hereinafter KARO,
BAIS YOSEF], Choshen Mishpat 33:1 (citing R. MORDECHAI B. HILLEL ASHKENAZI
(thirteenth century), RAV MORDECHAI [hereinafter MORDECHAI] to SANHEDRIN §
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The professional responsibilities of Jewish law judges, or dayanim
(singular: dayan), extend beyond maintaining the courts’ requisite
third-party vantage. A dayan’s duty is to, as the Talmud puts it, “issue true and honest judgments.”132 “True” decisions are substantively
correct applications of Torah law norms to the facts of each case,133
and “honest” rulings are conclusions motivated solely by a judges’
commitment to uphold and enforce the halacha, unadulterated by extralegal considerations or personal value judgments.134 To help
dayanim fulfill their charge, Jewish law obligates judges to voluntarily recuse from cases that implicate their personal biases.135 Unlike interested dayanim who are disqualified because they cease being jurists,136 potentially partial judges are legally competent to preside and
are only obligated to recuse ex ante out of concern that despite their
best efforts they will fail to rule “truthfully and honestly.”137 Therefore, if a dayan wrongfully presides over and rules on a matter that
implicates his biases, the decision—if substantively correct—will
stand, whatever his failure to recuse might say about the judge’s personal and professional integrity.138

698) (“All those [judges or witnesses] that are disqualified, even after they rule or testify [accurately] in a case, their rulings and testimony are void.”).
132. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 10a.
133. See DEUTERONOMY 16:19 (“Do not twist the law.”); TOSFOS to BAVA BASRA
8b (s.v. Din).
134. See TOSFOS to MEGILLAH 15b (s.v. Zeh); BEIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 1:2
(s.v. V’zehu Kavanas Raboseinu); R. MOSHE DOVID ASHKENAZI (1774–1814), BE’ER
SHEVA, Sanhedrin 111b; HAGAOS V’HEAROS to R. YAAKOV B. ASHER (D. 1343),
ARBAH TURIM [hereinafter ARBAH TURIM], Choshen Mishpat 1:17 and sources cited
therein (Machon Yerushalayim 1993); see also HIRSCH, HOREB, supra note 112, at
266 (“The duty of the judge is to be not more, but also not less, than the mere instrument of the law, and thus hold himself completely above case and party.”). A judge’s
injecting personal considerations into his judicial decision making process—even if
these extralegal motivations do not alter the substantive correctness of the ruling—
undermines the other-referential character of the decision, negating the quintessential moralizing purpose of halachic adjudication. Id.
135. See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
137. See R. YEHOSHUA FALK, SEFER MEIROS EINAYIM 33:1 [hereinafter SMA]
(“Judgment is dependent on [the judge’s] reasoning, and his thought processes may
be changed on account of [the judge’s] love or hatred [for a litigant], even without
malicious intentions.”).
138. See MISHNA TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6 (“It is prohibited for a person to judge a party he loves . . . [so too,] one may not judge a person he hates . . . “).
Commentators point to Maimonides’ decision to write that a biased judge is “prohibited” (assur) rather than “disqualified” (pasul) from judging as indicative of his holding that a biased judge is only initially prohibited from deciding cases implicating his
personal preferences, but that if he rules correctly in such cases the decision is legally
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Dayanim must also maintain exceedingly high standards of personal integrity in excess of what may be required to rule truthfully and
honestly.139 The Torah prescribes the inherent equality of all people,
distinguishing between them only in terms of their differing rights and
obligations under the law.140 Dayanim are obligated to affirm and actualize this concept by treating litigants equally, demonstrating that
plaintiff, defendant, judge, and court are brought to together and hold
power over one another only by virtue of their collective moralizing
commitment to abide by God’s law.141 Additionally, judges, like all
Jews, must constantly strive to suppress their base instincts and internalize as their own God’s chessed-focused value judgments as expressed in the halacha.142 In support of this lofty vision or judges’
personal obligations, Jewish law demands that judicial candidates
possess a wide array of meritorious character traits, including humility, aversion to wealth and luxury, a love of truth and justice, a love of
people, and a good reputation.143
2.

Grounds for Disqualification and Recusal in Jewish Law

This Section examines the substantive halacha governing the removal of judges. Subpart I.B.2.a. discusses instances in which a judge
is disqualified because his connection to a case is incompatible with
the institutional role of the beis din in the adjudication process. Subpart I.B.2.b. then reviews grounds for which a dayan may be ex ante
prohibited from presiding and obliged to voluntarily recuse. Subpart
I.B.2.c. concludes by discussing the Jewish law judges’ extrajudicial
obligations to develop their personal integrity by affording equal
treatment and consideration to every litigant.

valid after the fact. See, e.g., BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:8 (s.v. Ein Hadayan);
R. YOSEF ISSER, SHA’AR MISHPAT 7:2.
139. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 2:7; infra Part I.B.2.c.
140. See R. YITZCHAK ARAMA (1420–1494), AKEIDAS YITZCHAK, Numbers 1:2;
Emanuel Rackman, Judaism and Equality, in JUDAISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33–34
(Milton Ridvas Konvitz ed., 2001).
141. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–11; infra notes 195–196 and
accompanying text.
142. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 1. For a discussion of the parallel principle that the Torah views all Jews as judges, constantly evaluating and deciding the
proper halachic course of conduct in every situation in which they find themselves,
and expected to always conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards
of judicial integrity, see Hon. Rick Haselton, Of Judging and Judaism, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 483, 489–90 (2011).
143. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 7:15; see also MISHNAH TORAH, The
Laws of Sanhedrin 2:7.
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Disqualification to Maintain the Institutional Integrity of the
Court

The Torah preserves courts’ institutional role as third-party adjudicators capable of providing litigants with other-referential, moralizing
evaluations of their halachic duties by disqualifying judges when their
connection to a case renders them parties to the litigation, undermining the court’s fundamental raison d’etre.144 This Subpart discusses
the rules governing these disqualifying relationships, which include
financial interests, close familial relationships, receiving bribes or
gifts, and issuing advisory opinions.
i.

Financial Interest

The Talmud disqualifies a resident judge from a case brought by
his town’s communal charity fund to collect an unpaid pledge,145 and
from an action brought by his community against a defendant accused
of stealing the town’s Torah scroll.146 The resident dayan is legally incapable of ruling, because in both cases he has a financial interest in
the outcome of the suit.147 In the Torah scroll case, the judge is a party
to the litigation because all Jews must hear public Torah readings
thrice weekly,148 and because the town’s citizens—including the
judge—will have to collectively purchase a new scroll if they fail to

144. See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.
145. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a (“If one says, ‘Give a sum of
money to the people of my city,’ the case may not be judged by judges of that city,
nor may evidence be presented based on the testimony of residents of that city.”).
For a discussion of the nature of communal charity funds as institutions and the capacity of these institutions to bring legal suits in court, see PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH
LAW 161–62 (Menachem Elon ed., 2007).
146. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a (“The residents of a city from
whom a Torah scroll was stolen; the case may not be judged by judges of that city,
and evidence may not be presented based on the testimony of the residents of that
city.”). For an overview of the legal remedies for alleged robbery or theft, see
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 359–78; see also Theft and Robbery, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_
0019_0_19785.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
147. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a.
148. According to the Talmud, the prophet Ezra enacted ten new laws when he led
the Jewish people from exile in Persia to resettle their lands in Israel. See generally
Ezra 1–4. Among these measures was that the Torah should be read publicly on
Mondays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, so that the masses should not pass three days
without Torah study. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA KAMMA 82a; 2 MENACHEM
ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 556 n.47 (Benard Auerbach &
Melvin S. Sykes trans., 1994) (1988).
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recover against the alleged thief.149 Likewise, in the charity fund case,
the judge is disqualified because the residents of every community are
obligated to support their poor,150 and recovering the bequest would
offset the charity burden otherwise born by the town’s residents, including the judge.151
According to the halachic codes,152 dayanim are disqualified for direct and indirect financial stakes in cases pending before them,153 as
well as for even small non-pecuniary interests in such matters.154 Be-

149. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a; 1 EMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 63 n.42 (1990); see also SHULCHAN ARUCH,
Choshen Mishpat 163:1 (“Members of the community may legally compel each other
. . . to purchase a Torah scroll.”).
150. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Yoreh Deah 256:1 (“[The community of] every city in
which there are Jews is obligated to appoint charity fund trustees who are wellknown and trustworthy in order that they may go and collect from each member of
the community the amount that has been fixed for him to contribute [to the public
fund].”); R. MOSHE ISSERLES, REMA [hereinafter ISSERLES, REMA] to SHULCHAN
ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 163:1; R. YECHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN (1829–1908) ARUCH
HASHULCHAN, Choshen Mishpat 163:1. For a more extensive discussion of local Jewish communities’ obligation to support their poor and the manner in which this burden devolves on the members of that community see generally AARON LEVINE, ECONOMICS & JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 107–37 (1987).
151. See RASHBAM (Samuel ben Meir c. 1085–c. 1158) to BAVA BASRA 43a (s.v.
D’keivan D’ravach); BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:17, 18 (s.v. U’mah Shekasuv
V’afilu); R. YOEL SIRKIS (1561–1640), BAYIS CHADASH [hereinafter BACH],
Choshen Mishpat 7:17; Quint, supra note 149, at 62 n.42.
152. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Evidence 15:2–3; ARBAH TURIM, Choshen
Mishpat 7:16–17; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7:12.
153. Compare SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:1 (ruling that where two
partners own a single property and a suit is brought against one of the partners alleging that the whole property had been stolen from the plaintiff and illegally sold to the
partner-defendant, the non-party partner is disqualified from judging the case) and
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:4 (ruling that a debtor holding a debt in
partnership with another party is disqualified from judging a case brought by the
creditor against only the partner for repayment of the loan) with SHULCHAN ARUCH,
Choshen Mishpat 37:11 (holding that where A holds a note of credit against B and
conveys the note to C, B is disqualified from judging an action seeking to invalidate
the conveyance since he may prefer to be indebted to A over C, or vice versa) and
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:15 (ruling that where A sells property to B
without a guarantee and C subsequently brings a suit against B to recover title to the
property, A is disqualified from judging the case since he may prefer that the property remain with B so that his own creditors can attach the property to pay debts owed
to them by A).
154. See, e.g., R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, RESPONSA ROSH 6:25 (disqualifying a judge
from deciding a case involving a bequest of books and lamps to the synagogue the
judge frequented, even though the members of the congregation would be under no
obligation to purchase these items themselves if the bequest was invalidated); R.
YOM TOV ASEVILLI (RITVA) (1250–1330), NOVELLAE TO BAVA BASRA 43a, n.62
(Mossad Harav Kook, ed.) (s.v. Ibayis Eimah) (quoting R. MEIR ABULAFIA (1170–

PILL_CHRISTENSEN

5/10/2012 12:43 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

540

[Vol. XXXIX

cause they cannot expressly provide for every kind and degree of interest that a judge may have in a case, the codes give dayanim discretion to determine whether a particular interest is disqualifying, but
caution judges to voluntarily recuse themselves in doubtful circumstances:
These matters are dependent on the mind of the judge and the
strength of his understanding of the roots of the legal issues and of
his knowledge of causation; he must delve deeply to determine
whether this [judge] has any interest in this judgment, even through
a far-off and circuitous route.155

ii.

Familial Relationships

Dayanim are disqualified from deciding cases involving their close
relatives because a court presided over by a litigant’s relative cannot
maintain its position as a third-party institution.156 Relationships between judges and litigants are reckoned in terms of degree157 by tracing the lineage of both the judge and party to a common ancestor and
then counting the number of generations each one is removed from
their common progenitor, each generation counting as one degree.158
A father and son or two brothers are thus termed “first-first” relations;159 a nephew and uncle, “first-second” relations; and first cousins
1244), RESPONSA RAMAH § 159) (holding a judge is disqualified for even nonpecuniary interests in the outcome of a case).
155. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:21.
156. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 159a (reasoning that disqualification
for familial relationship cannot be premised on a concern for biased judgment since
even Moses and Aaron themselves would be ineligible to judge each other because
they were brothers); HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, DEUTERONOMY 24:16
(“The reason for this halacha lies in the very nature of the Jewish institution of jurisdiction by judges.”); cf. SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1; EIBESHUTZ, supra note 130, at
33:1.
157. See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2–12; ARBAH TURIM,
Choshen Mishpat 33:3–41.
158. See QUINT, supra note 149, at 234–36 (explaining the Jewish law approach to
degrees of relation, and providing a list of thirty-five permutations of disqualifying
judge-litigant familial relations); see also Rabbi Meyer Waxman, Criminal and Civil
Procedure of Jewish Courts, in STUDIES IN JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 181, 212 (Edward
M. Gorshfield ed., 1971).
159. A father and his son are first-first relations since each is one generation removed from their common relative. In this case, in accordance with the Talmudic
dictum “a man is related to himself,” the father himself is the common relative of
both parties. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 25a. Legally speaking, the father is
one generation removed from himself, and the son is one generation removed from
the father, and father and son are therefore “first-first” relatives, each being one legal
generation removed from the common ancestor, the father. See BACH, supra note
151, at 33:3.
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are referred to as “second-second” relatives.160 Dayanim cannot
judge cases involving first-first, first-second, or second-second degree
relatives.161 Some authorities maintain that judges are also disqualified from presiding over cases involving first-third relations, such as a
great-grandfather and great-grandson or great-nephew and great uncle.162 Most hold, however, that such relationships are not disqualifying, and that they merely obligate the presiding judge to voluntarily
recuse for bias.163 Individuals related in the second-third or thirdthird degrees, as well as those more distantly related, may judge each
other according to all opinions.164
iii. Bribes, Gifts, and Personal Favors
The Torah instructs: “You shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the
eyes of the clear-sighted and corrupt the words of the righteous.”165
The Talmud explains homiletically that bribery is called “shochad” in
Hebrew because it makes the judge and bribing litigant like one—

160. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu) (“The
degrees of relation are reckoned by descent from a common ancestor. Thus, father
and son, brother and brother, are relatives of the first degree: first-first; cousins are
relatives of the second degree: second-second; nephew and uncle, grandson and
grandfather are first-second; great-grandson and great-grandfather, great-nephew
and great-uncle are first third, and so forth.”).
161. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 33:2.
162. See, e.g., TOSFOS to BAVA BASRA 129a (s.v. Eehi); BAAL HALACHOS
GEDOLOS, The Laws of Testimony § 51. See generally BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat
33:6 (s.v. Aval L’Rabbeinu Tam).
163. See, e.g., R. YITZCHAK ALFASI (11th century), RIF, Bava Basra 56b; R.
YITZCHAK ALFASI, RIF, Sanhedrin 6b; MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Witnesses
13:4–5; RAMA to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2 (suggesting that even
though first-third relatives are not disqualified from judging each other, it is nevertheless proper for them to voluntarily recuse themselves from such cases, though
their failure to do so will not invalidate a substantively correct ruling). See generally
BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 33:3.
164. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2. Regardless of whether or not
a distantly related judge is fully disqualified, he must remain vigilant of his own partiality and is encouraged to voluntarily recuse himself from any suit involving a relative towards whom he may be unable to remain entirely dispassionate and concerned
solely for the law. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
165. Exodus 23:8. The halacha’s concern for judicial graft is so severe that many
halachic codes introduce their discussion of the subject with a double exhortation: “A
judge must be very, very careful not to take a bribe, even to find for the party who is
anyway in the right.” ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:1 (emphasis added);
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1; see also SMA, supra note 137, at 9:1.
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“shehu chad.”166 A bribed dayan thus becomes a party to the case and
is legally incapable of presiding.167
Disqualifying benefits include all valuable goods or services conveyed by a party to a judge while the litigant’s case is docketed in the
dayan’s court.168 Judges are even disqualified for borrowing household goods from neighbors who are also parties to litigation before
the judge.169 Talmudic judges held themselves disqualified in numerous seemingly innocuous circumstances, such as where a litigant
brushed a feather from the judge’s robe, where a party kicked some
166. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b. The fundamental incompatibility
of bribery with the beis din’s proper institutional role is further evidenced by the rule
disqualifying judges for accepting equally valuable gifts from each party in a case.
Even though such even-handed bribery would not likely sway a judge to favor one
litigant over the other, it is nevertheless disqualifying because a bribed judge ceases
to be the embodiment of the third-party court and becomes a party to the case. See
R. YEHOSHUA FALK, DRISHA to ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:1; SMA, supra
note 137, at 9:2. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105a (discussing the case of a
judge who accepted an equal sum from each litigant in payment for his judicial services, and then questioning the judge’s conduct as a violation of the prohibition on
accepting bribes).
167. See MISHNAH, BECHOROS 4:6 (“The rulings of a judge that accepts payment
for judging are null and void.”); BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:9 (“It
appears to me that anytime a judge accepts [a benefit] that falls within the legal definition of a bribe, his rulings are null and void.”).
168. See BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:4. A dayan is not ordinarily
disqualified, however, by his receiving a gift or other benefit prior to the giver’s filing
his claim or appeal in the recipient judge’s court, even if the immanency of the litigant was commonly known at the time the gift was given. See ARBAH TURIM,
Choshen Mishpat 9:6; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:2. Nevertheless, because such gifts may result in the recipient judge’s finding it difficult to remain impartial, judges that receive such preemptive gifts from prospective litigants are strongly
urged to voluntarily recuse themselves as an expression of personal integrity. See
ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:6; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:2; R.
AVRAHAM TZVI HIRSCH EISENSTADT (1813–1868), PISCHEI TESHUVA, Choshen
Mishpat 9:5. But see, Eisenstadt, supra, at 9:7 (“If the judge feels that the gift was
sent to him only because the giver expected to appear before him in litigation . . .
even if [the case is not to be heard] for some time after the gift is given, the judge is
disqualified.” (citing BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:6)).
169. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1 (“Any judge that borrows
something is disqualified from judging the lender.”). A judge might preside over a
case involving his creditor, however, if the nature of their relationship is one of ordinary social convention. Thus, if a judge borrows from a party while also being in a
position to lend to that party, the debtor-creditor relationship is considered ordinary
neighborly sociability, and is not disqualifying. See id. (“[Disqualification for borrowing from a party] applies only if the judge does not have what to lend; but if he has
what to lend he is qualified, since the party, too, may borrow from him.”). Even if a
judge borrows something from a litigant as a matter of ordinary social convention, he
may still be disqualified if circumstances indicate that the loan was made on account
of the lender’s pending litigation before the judge. See RAMAH to SHULCHAN
ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1.
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dirt to cover spittle that lay at the judge’s feet, and where a litigant
who was also the judge’s sharecropper delivered the year’s crop to the
judge shortly before it was actually due.170 Some authorities even disqualify dayanim to whom a litigant says “good morning” or offers
other salutations or compliments unless the comments could be considered ordinary social conventions.171
iv. Advisory Opinions
Judges are disqualified from deciding cases about which they previously issued advisory opinions.172 Privately issued legal opinions by
halachic decisors in response to questions submitted to them by
members of the public, or responsa, are a major feature of the Torah
law system.173 R. Shmuel de Medina (1505-1589) explained:
[O]nce a judge has decided [in a responsa] a question posed to him
by one [who later appears before him as a] litigant, how can the
judge now listen to the arguments of the other litigant, for [by committing himself to a certain legal view on the matter] he has attached
himself to the subject matter of the case . . . . Therefore, it appears
to me that one who has ruled [privately] on a matter cannot be a
judge in that case . . . for he is interested in the litigation. 174

Thus, a judge is disqualified from presiding over a case about which
he previously decided in a responsa because he has an interest in sustaining his original ruling, and is therefore a party to the litigation.175

170. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b.
171. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:3; R. YOSEF COLON
TRABATTO (1420–1480), RESPONSA MAHARIK § 16. Most authorities rule that such
trite platitudes do not disqualify a judge, but that a judge who receives such comments should take stock of his continuing ability to remain impartial, and if in doubt
should voluntarily recuse himself. See TOSFOS to KESUBOS 105b (s.v. Lo);
MORDECHAI, supra note 131, at Sanhedrin § 683; TRABATTO, supra, at § 21. See generally BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:4; Eisenstadt, supra note 168, at
Choshen Mishpat 9:4.
172. See RAMAH to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:5 (“A scholar must
not provide a litigant with a prospective ruling on a matter pending before him, nor
may he offer his opinion—even without writing a formal decision—as long as he has
not yet heard both side’s arguments.”); see also R. SHABTAI HAKOHEN (1621–1662),
SIFSEI KOHEIN 17:9 [hereinafter SHACH].
173. See generally HANINA BEN-MENAHEM & NEIL S. HECHT, AUTHORITY PROCESS AND METHOD: STUDIES IN JEWISH LAW 59–101 (1998) (discussing the history
and legal authority of responsa literature).
174. R. SHMUEL DE MEDINA, RESPONSA MAHARASHDAM, Choshen Mishpat § 2.
175. See R. YOSEF TRANI (1538–1639), RESPONSA MAHARIT § 79.
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Voluntary Recusal to Preserve the Professional Integrity of the
Judge

Dayanim must render “true,” substantively correct judgments, and
also keep their decision-making processes “honest” and free of personal motivations.176 The Torah therefore obligates dayanim to recuse themselves from judging matters that strongly implicate their personal biases, or about which they have extrajudicial knowledge, bebecause, despite their best efforts, they may fail to rule truthfully and
honestly.177 Because a biased judge’s deciding a case is not incompatible with the court’s institutional third-party role, however, a substantively correct decision by a dayan who improperly failed to recuse
himself is valid ex post.178 This Section discusses the instances that
trigger a judge’s duty to voluntarily recuse himself, including where
he is biased, and where he has prior extrajudicial knowledge about a
case.
i.

Bias and the Appearance of Bias

Even an integrious and pious judge may be unable to rule truthfully and honestly in cases that strongly implicate his personal preferences.179 The Talmud therefore instructs that “[a] man should not
judge someone he loves or someone he hates.”180 To trigger a judge’s
duty to recuse himself, a litigant must demonstrate that the judge is
actually biased.181 Even if actual bias is not proven, however, the Torah urges challenged judges to step down because a litigant’s allega176. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
177. See SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1 (“Judgment is dependent on [the judge’s]
reasoning, and thought processes may be changed on account of [the judge’s] love or
hatred [for a litigant], even without malicious intentions.”).
178. See Maimonides who writes: “It is prohibited (assur) for a person to judge a
party he loves . . . So too, one may not judge a person he hates . . . .” MISHNAH
TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6. Several commentators point to Maimonides’
conscious decision to write that a biased judge is “prohibited” rather than “disqualified” (pasul) from judging as indicative of his holding that a biased judge is only prohibited from deciding cases implicating his personal preferences, but that if he did
rule correctly in the case, his ruling is legally valid after the fact. See, e.g., BAIS
YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (s.v. Vichein Kasav); ISSER, supra note 138, at 7:2.
179. See SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1
180. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b.
181. See RAMA to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7 (“One who says about a
judge that he hates him, or that he loves his opponent is not believed, and needs
proof for his allegation.”).
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tion of judicial partiality may result in the judge’s unconscious prejudice toward him.182 The halachic codes further direct judges to recuse
themselves from all matters that in their own self-introspective judgment strongly implicate their personal values.183
Halachic authorities disagree about the precise parameters of judges’ duty to recuse themselves. Some distinguish between cases of extreme and nominal bias, disqualifying judges in cases of the former,
but only obligating them to recuse ex ante in the latter.184 Relying on
Talmudic precedent, these authorities maintain that extreme bias only exists in very limited circumstances, such as where the judge has intentionally refrained from speaking to the litigant out of enmity.185
Less troubling manifestations of judicial partiality are not disqualifying and merely obligate a dayan to recuse ex ante.186 Most halachic
decisors disagree with this framework, however, and rule that bias—
no matter how extreme—is never disqualifying.187 These authorities
maintain that all allegedly biased judges are only obligated to volun-

182. See R. YAAKOV KARLINER, RESPONSA MISHKENOS YAAKOV § 7.
183. See generally AVRAHAM DREBERMDIGER, SEDER HADIN 341–43 (2010).
184. See, e.g., R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, PISKEI HAROSH to SANHEDRIN 3:23; ARBAH
TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 7:8; R. DOVID HALEVI SEGEL (1586–1667), TUREI ZAHAV,
Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (s.v. Ein Hadayan Yachol Ladon); 1 R. YAIR BACHRACH
(1639–1702), RESPONSA CHAVAS YAIR § 141. Mandatory disqualification in cases of
extreme bias, like other grounds for full disqualification, would appear to be premised on the notion that the judge’s unusually close friendship or bitter rivalry with
one of the litigants does not merely incline him to a partial verdict, but actually gives
him a stake in the outcome of the case: his close friend’s winning or his bitter enemy’s
losing the case is really his own victory. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 23a
(tracing disqualification of an extremely biased judge to a biblical verse, Numbers
35:23, interpreted to disqualify a judge specifically when the judge himself wants to
cause one of the litigants to lose the case).
185. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 27b; see also SIFRI, Deuteronomy §
181–83 (deriving the three day rule from scriptural sources). An even more restrictive view of disqualifying bias, maintaining that a judge who served as a party’s wedding attendant is only disqualified on the first day following the wedding, is cited by
EISENSTADT, supra note 168, at Choshen Mishpat 7:13. EIBESHUTZ, supra note 130, at
7:17, rules that while the Jewish people remain in the Diaspora, their happiness is reduced, and consequently, the especially close friendship between a groom and his
groomsman lasts only for one day. Therefore, a groomsman-judge is disqualified
from presiding over a case involving the groom on the day of the wedding, but not for
any period of time thereafter.
186. See R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, supra note 154, at 56:9 (“If a judge proceeds to
preside” over a case implicating his biases, the litigant prejudiced by the judge’s bias
“cannot disqualify him entirely unless he demonstrates by eyewitness testimony that
the judge had not spoken to him in the last three days out of enmity.”).
187. See SMA, supra note 137, at 7:19.
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tarily recuse ex ante, and that their failure to step down will not invalidate their otherwise substantively correct rulings ex post.188
ii.

Prior Knowledge

The Torah says, “I charged your judges with their duties, saying:
‘Hear disputes between your brethren, and then you may judge correctly and justly between man and his fellow.’”189 The Talmud interprets this verse as requiring dayanim to learn about a case only
through adversarial judicial proceedings.190 A dayan who receives information about a case without the benefit of also hearing an opposing point of view in the context of formal adversarial proceedings
risks unconsciously closing his mind to alternative narratives and issuing a partial decision.191
This rule is restated in the halachic codes, which obligate judges
who receive extrajudicial information about a case to recuse themselves, though such knowledge is not fully disqualifying.192 Maimonides recognizes the prior knowledge rule as a judicial ideal: “Both litigants must be equal in the eyes of the judge, and there is no more
correct and righteous judge than one that does not recognize the litigants or the subject matter of the case.”193

188. See, e.g., BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (explaining Maimonides’ position on judicial bias in MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6 as disqualifying
extremely biased judges and invalidating their verdicts, but merely obligating moderately biased judges to recuse themselves and validating their substantively correct decisions rendered in violation of this prohibition against sitting); SMA, supra note 137,
at 7:18–19. Some of the more permissive opinions still distinguish between extreme
and nominal bias, holding that extreme bias obligates the judge to recuse, while nominal bias has no legal ramifications on the judge whatsoever, though he is nevertheless urged to step down as an expression of personal piety and integrity. See TOSFOS
to SANHEDRIN 8a (s.v. Pasilnah); MORDECHAI to SANHEDRIN § 683.
189. Deuteronomy 1:16 (emphasis added).
190. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 7b.
191. See RASHI to SANHEDRIN 7b (s.v. Shomeah Bein Acheichem) (“The judge
should listen to the litigants evidence and claims when they are both together before
him, but he must not hear one account without the other side’s being present, for it
will cause him to set falsehood as truth since there is nothing [presently] contradicting
it. And since the judge’s heart will be inclined to rule in favor of the narrative he
hears alone, he may not be able to bring himself to find in favor of the side he hears
from later [during court proceedings].”).
192. See, e.g., SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:5; SMA, supra note 137, at
17:11 (“[Once a judge has received extrajudicial information about a case] he may not
preside over the case thereafter unless the parties agree to be judged in his court even
though he has already heard about the case.”); R. YAAKOV B. MOSHE LEVI MOELIN
(1365–1427), RESPONSA MAHARIL § 195.
193. MISHNAH TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6.
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Judges’ Extralegal Duty to Treat Litigants Equally

Dayanim must maintain high standards of personal integrity in
their management of court proceedings.194 “Every [Jew] is obligated
to uphold the Torah, and this common obligation forms the bond that
joins . . . the witnesses . . . the litigants and the judges: . . . This
bond . . . must be apparent throughout the whole legal procedure, and
should be emphasized with full clarity, unalloyed by a foreign element.”195 Dayanim affirm their commitment to the halacha and their
humble role in God’s creative order by treating every party equally,
privately internalizing and publicly affirming that “the judgment is
God’s,”196 and that everyone—especially the judge—is equally bound
by Torah law.
The halacha prescribes numerous personal judicial obligations designed to ensure that every litigant is (and believes he is) treated
equally under God’s law.197 The general refrain, “judges must be
careful to treat the litigants equally,”198 entails a variety of specific obligations.199 Judges may not allow one party to present its case at
length while cutting the other short;200 they may not speak to one litigant amicably and to the other harshly;201 they may not allow one party to sit in court while requiring the other to stand;202 and they may
not permit one side to bring counsel to court while denying that opportunity to the other party.203 Judges must even ensure that a litigant does not appear in court dressed in a manner that would intimidate his opponent,204 and must help unintelligent litigants articulate
194. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
195. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu); see
also Dr. Naftali Hirsch, Pricip des Beweifes und Beweisverfahrens im Criminalprozes
des Jud Rechtes, 12 JESHURUN 80 (1865) (Ger.) [hereinafter Hirsch, Pricip].
196. Deuteronomy 1:17.
197. See generally MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23; ARBAH TURIM,
Choshen Mishpat 17; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17.
198. ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 17:1; see also MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws
of Sanhedrin 21:1 (“What is correct and righteous judgment? This is when both litigants are made equal [in the eyes of the judge] in all matters.”).
199. See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–4.
200. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHEVUOS 30a; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen
Mishpat 17:1.
201. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHEVUOS 30a; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen
Mishpat 17:1.
202. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–3.
203. See MORDECHAI to SANHEDRIN § 761; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat
17:4.
204. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1 (“If one litigant wears noticeably expensive clothing while the other is dressed in a cheap and degrading manner,
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their claims.205 These rules negate distinctions of class, wealth, social
standing, and even intelligence, emphasizing the inherent equality of
participants in the adjudicatory process and their equal obligation to
the Torah.206 These rules also promote rulings grounded solely in legal value judgments by protecting judges’ decision-making processes
against the subconscious influence of parties’ appearance, social
standing, or articulateness.207
II. THE AMERICAN AND HALACHIC DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL
REMOVAL: A COMPARISON
This Part discusses four principle differences between American
and Jewish disqualification jurisprudence. First, American recusal
law is grounded in rights-based jurisprudence, but the halachic approach relies on a duty-focused legal tradition.208 Second, American
law polices actual and apparent judicial bias in order to protect litigants’ rights and promote public confidence on the court system, but
Jewish recusal doctrine focuses on preserving proper institutional arrangements between courts, judges, and litigants, and on engendering
a professionally and personally integrious judiciary.209 Third, the
American doctrine relies on mandatory disqualification to ensure judicial impartiality, while the halachic approach limits top-down disqualification in favor of utilizing judges’ duty-consciousness and self-

the judges say to the well-dressed party, ‘either dress your opponent as you dress
yourself, or dress as he does.’”); see also MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin
21:2. Because in modern times disparities in dress between rich and poor are less
pronounced than they once were, however, batei din do not maintain this practice,
and instead verbally assure a poorly dressed litigant that his appearance will in no
way cause the court to favor his better dressed opponent for “justice can uproot
mountains.” BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 17:1 (s.v. V’im Ha’echan
Lavush Begadim Na’im); see SHACH, supra note 172, at 17:2.
205. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:9 (“If the judge is aware of a favorable argument for one of the litigants, and sees that the litigant wants to articulate
the argument but cannot—either because he does not know how to organize his
words; or, because he has forgotten the argument on account of his being agitated by
his desire to save himself with a true claim, or due to the anger he feels [towards his
opponent]; or because he is embarrassed on account of his weak intelligence—the
judge should help him by reminding him of the beginning of the argument . . . .”).
206. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu); see
also Hirsch, Pricip, supra note 195; QUINT, supra note 149, at 132–35.
207. See RASHI to SHEVUOS 31a (s.v. Lavush K’mosoh) (“So that the [exquisite
dress] of one party should not cause the judges to incline their faces [i.e., incline their
decision making] towards him.”).
208. See infra notes 212–20 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 221–29 and accompanying text.
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discipline to achieve unbiased judging.210 Finally, in American law a
judge’s improper failure to recuse himself warrants reversal of his final judgment, while the halacha voids a biased judge’s ruling only
when it is substantively incorrect, relying instead on peer review of
the dayan’s personal and professional decisions to ensure an
integrious judiciary.211
American political and legal culture—including judicial disqualification law—is dominated by rights-based thinking; it is concerned
primarily with what individuals and societies can properly demand
from one another.212 In rights-focused jurisprudence, the law articulates positive and negative entitlements which provide individuals
with the freedom to act secure from interference within these rightsprotected spheres.213 Modern recusal jurisprudence, too, is rightsfocused; litigants are entitled to an impartial judge,214 entitled to a
court system that upholds their legal rights in both fact and appearance, and entitled to a justice system in which they can place their
trust.215
The chessed-based halachic system, by contrast, is principally concerned with duties,216 with what individuals and societies owe to one
another and the self-transcendental moral quality of public and pri-

210. See infra notes 223–35 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 238–42 and accompanying text.
212. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF OUR POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3–5 (1991); John Laws, Beyond Rights, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUDIES 265, 265–66 (2003) (“The vocabulary of modern liberal speech is very largely the vocabulary of rights.”).
213. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171–73 (1977).
214. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
216. See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & REL. 65, 65 (1987) (“The principle word in Jewish law, which occupies a
place equivalent in evocative force to the American legal system’s ‘rights,’ is the word
‘mitzvah,’ which literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer to
‘incumbent obligation.’”); see also SOL ROTH, HALAKHA AND POLITICS: THE JEWISH
IDEA OF THE STATE 97 (1988); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Serious-

ly: A Look at American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective
of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 182 (2007); Silberg, supra note
116, at 312 (“[In Jewish law], when a person refuses to pay his debt he is physically
coerced to fulfill his religious obligation to pay. The concern of the court is not the
creditor’s debt, his damages, but the duty of the debtor, his religious-moral duty, the
fulfillment of a precept by him. The creditor receives his money almost incidentally,
as a secondary result of the performance of this duty.”).
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vate conduct.217 Jewish disqualification doctrine, therefore, focuses
on what batei din and dayanim owe litigants rather than on what disputants may demand from courts and judges. Batei din owe disputants a moralizing, other-referential determination of their Torah obligations.218 Dayanim are obligated to issue “true and honest”
decisions,219 and have a duty to develop their humane qualities in a
chessed-focused manner by treating parties equally under the law.220
Based on their different jurisprudential traditions, the American
and Jewish recusal schemes offer unique visions of the goals of judicial disqualification.
American doctrine, grounded in rightsjurisprudence, seeks to preserve litigants’ and the public’s right to a
justice system that metes out impartial decisions grounded in legal
norms.221 To this end, the American approach prevents actually or
apparently biased rulings by disqualifying judges from cases that implicate their biases.222 Thus, like American law generally, contemporary recusal doctrine enforces minimal standards of conduct without
encouraging unnecessarily integrious actions;223 as long as the bad
man cannot be (or pays for being) bad, it matters little whether we
teach and encourage him to be good.224 American recusal doctrine
217. See DWORKIN, supra note 213. For an articulate explication of the moral distinction between rights-based and duty-focused jurisprudence, see Laws, supra note
212, at 269.
[W]hat is meant by the statement that I have a moral right—a right to do
something, or a right not to have something done to me? It is not a statement that implies any virtue on my part. I am not good because I assert that
I have a right. I am not bad because I do not do so. The assertion of a right
involves no moral action on my part. There is nothing virtuous in my asserting it. It is not an act of self sacrifice or self restraint, kindness or consideration towards anyone else; it is not other centered, it claims what is due, or
what is thought to be due.

Id.
218. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part I.A..
223. This general tendency of American law is well exemplified by rules like the
tort doctrine of no affirmative duty to rescue. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§37 (2005). Cf. Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless Child’s Right to
a Permanent Family, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (“Constitutional requirements typically function as negative rights. They prohibit governmental actors from
usurping powers beyond the scope of their authority and they protect individuals
from certain forms of state action, rather than imposing affirmative duties on the
government to provide for the individual’s protection and welfare.”).
224. For a discussion of the “bad man” theory of law, see Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (1897).
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thus controls judicial bias to protect private and public rights, but
does not impose ethical standards beyond those necessary to preserve
the rights of litigants and the public.225
Duty-oriented Jewish disqualification law is less concerned with
preventing dishonest judges from harming litigants and more focused
on directing dayanim to be as moral and integrious as possible.226 The
halacha cannot merely prevent wrongdoing, it must also teach and
empower potential wrongdoers to do right; helping man be good is
the raison d’etre of the Torah law system.227 Therefore, Jewish law
does not coercively prevent partial judges from acting dishonestly, but
instead directs them to voluntarily preserve their professional trust228
and to develop their personal integrity.229
The American and Jewish doctrines also diverge in their approaches to enforcing recusal rules. Rights-based American disqualification
law relies on a top-down scheme for removing judges.230 When a
judge’s impartiality can be reasonably questioned, that judge is adjudged unfit to preside; he is disqualified regardless of his own selfconscious assessment of his ability to rule impartially.231 Consonant
with American law’s rights-foundations, this mandatory approach ensures that litigants’ and the public’s rights are protected against biased
judgments,232 even as its stifling judicial self-discipline fails to encourage integrious judging grounded in judges’ sense of institutional, professional, and personal duty.233
The Jewish disqualification regime, by contrast, is a bottom-up system. The halacha mandatorily disqualifies judges only when their
presiding would be inconsistent with the courts’ institutional function,234 and in such instances disqualification is more descriptive than
prescriptive; a judge simply cannot be a party to a suit and still remain
a judge.235 In all cases where a judge’s fitness to rule turns on his sub225. Indeed, the duty to sit doctrine might actually discourage morally-minded jurists from acting with integrity by recusing themselves from cases from which they are
not legally disqualified to protect the rights of the parties. See infra notes 281–282
and accompanying text and sources.
226. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 216.
228. See supra notes 124–43 and accompanying text.
229. See generally supra Part I.B.2.c.
230. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
231. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
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jective state of mind, the halacha relies on the judge himself to
integriously evaluate his own impartiality and to determine whether
he should voluntarily recuse due to the risk of biased judgment.236 By
insuring impartial judging through voluntary recusal, the halachic system infuses judges with a sense of moral obligation, encouraging them
to live up to the law’s high expectations.237
The Jewish and American doctrines also differ in how they deal
post hoc with decisions improperly issued by judges who should have
recused. American law immediately addresses the problem of biased
rulings by disqualifying potentially partial judges before they can express their prejudices in judicial opinions.238 When prophylactic disqualification fails and a judge presides when he should have recused
himself, the judge’s final disposition is reversed on appeal, even if the
decision is substantively correct, thereby preserving litigants’ rights
and public confidence in the courts.239
The halacha, however, only voids judicial decisions when they cannot be fairly characterized as court proceedings on account of the
judge’s being a party to the case.240 When a partial dayan decides a
case after wrongly failing to recuse himself, however, his ruling is considered substantively; the decision is reversed if it cannot be legally
justified, but upheld if it can be justified.241 A biased judge who fails

236. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text.
237. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 1:2 (quoting 2 Chronicles 17:6) (“[Jehoshaphat] appointed judges for every city, and he said to them: ‘Be well aware of
what you do, for it is not for men that you judge, but for God! And He will be with
you in judgment.’”).
238. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judging, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 460 (2004)
(“[D]isqualification . . . can be effective at screening out [biased] judges.”).
239. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 1012 (“The traditional rule was that when a disqualified judge sat in violation of an express statutory standard, his rulings were to be
vacated on appeal.”); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (holding that a partial judge’s presiding over a case is a “structural defect” in the proceedings that is not subject to “harmless-error’ standards”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise

of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification and a Stronger Conception of the
Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 758 (2011) (“[A] judge about
whom there exists a reasonable question regarding impartiality should not preside.
Everything taking place in the case after the improper failure to recuse is wrongful,
and the resulting outcome should logically be viewed as a nullity . . . .”). But see, e.g.,
Lyons v. Sheetz, 834 F.2d 493, 495 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987) (ruling that while the trial judge
should have disqualified himself, his decision should be upheld because it was the only possible reasonable disposition); Powell v. Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107, 120 (Minn.
2003) (“[N]ot every case involving judicial disqualification deserves vacatur.”).
240. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
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to recuse himself, but whose decision is upheld as substantively correct may nevertheless be disciplined if his ethical failing is deemed indicative of his unfitness to hold judicial office.242
The respective American and halachic approaches to recusal thus
come full circle. The American disqualification doctrine is grounded
in a culture of rights, and focuses strictly on protecting the entitlement to a fair legal process by enforcing minimum standards of impartial judicial decision-making through a top-down mandatory disqualification scheme supplemented by ex post reversal of biased
judges’ decisions. By contrast, traditional Jewish recusal law is rooted
in duty-jurisprudence, and concentrates on fostering judges’ moral integrity by directing batei din and dayanim to maintain high standards
of institutional, professional, and personal integrity through a largely
voluntary recusal scheme that still protects litigants’ rights by reversing actually biased judicial rulings.
III. MOVING IN A NEW DIRECTION: TOWARD A DUTY-FOCUSED
RECUSAL JURISPRUDENCE
This Part suggests that the conceptual disqualification framework
of traditional Jewish law provides a valuable perspective that might
be used to improve the problem-plagued contemporary American
doctrine. This Part begins in Section III.A., which highlights the need
for recusal reform by laying out some serious failings of the contemporary recusal regime, all of which relate to the rights-based and
mandatory-disqualification-focused nature of the current approach.
In light of these problems, Section III.B. proposes a duty-based alternative to contemporary disqualification jurisprudence based on
halachic recusal law, which, by focusing on the third-party institutional role of courts and the personal and professional ethical obligations
of judges, might improve on some of the deficiencies that inhere in
the current disqualification system.
A. Problems with the Current American Doctrine
Rights-based American disqualification doctrine seeks to protect
litigants’ rights and to promote public confidence in the courts by
mandatorily removing judges in an expansive array of circumstances

242. Cf. MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 2:8 (discussing ethical and moral standards of judicial conduct and integrity and implying that judges failing to meet
these criteria are unfit to remain on the bench).
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in which the law determines they are or appear to be biased.243 This
Section discusses three major failings of the contemporary recusal regime that stem from its rights-focused jurisprudential foundations,
and which highlight the need for a new disqualification framework
not grounded in rights-jurisprudence. Subpart III.A.1. argues that
recusal law fails to adequately protect litigants’ rights from biased
judging because the doctrine conclusorily determines judges’ impartiality based on malleable decisional standards. Subpart III.A.2. contends that the law’s quixotic obsession with appearances fails to engender public confidence in the justice system because it over and
under enforces actual judicial impartiality. Finally, Subpart III.A.3.
argues that American recusal jurisprudence fails to address the root
of the judicial bias problem because the contemporary rights-focused
doctrine virtually ignores judges’ personal and professional moral integrity.

1.

The Failure of Ad Hoc and Conclusory Recusal Doctrines to
Adequately Protect Litigants from Biased Judgments

American recusal doctrine purports to protect the rights of individual litigants from biased judging by disqualifying judges that are or
appear to be biased.244 Bias, however, is a vague and subjective concept, more a statement of legal conclusion than an actual description
of a judge’s state of mind. Judges, like all human beings, are biased;245 such personal values literally “constitute our being.”246 Most

243. See supra Part II.
244. See supra Part I.A.1.
245. See CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES (Daniel Kaneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000); Burg, supra note 22, at 1485; Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 237 (“We all take it
for granted that personal values and assumptions help shape every judge’s decisions.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 606
(1996); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of Embedded
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921) (“[Human beings] try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own.”); Catherine A Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 68 (2005)
(“[A]bsolute impartiality is impossible as a matter of cognitive psychology.”). Cf.
CARDOZO, supra, at 167, 176.
246. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS 129 (1983) (quoting HANS GORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976)); see also Harold Bloom, Breaking the Form, in
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 1, 9 (Jacques Derrida, et al., eds., 1979) (“There is
always and only bias, inclination, pre-judgment, swerve.”); Leubsdorf, supra note 29,
at 250 (“[U]nconscious motives sway everyone”).
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biases—a preference for chicken over beef, or a strong commitment
to majoritarian government—do not rise to the level of disqualifying
prejudice, however.247 The right biases—preconceptions representing
the community’s most cherished values—are not only tolerated, but
encouraged.248 Judges are only disqualified for the wrong kinds of biases, the kinds of “wrongful or inappropriate”249 impressions that, in
the eyes of the law, lead to judgments based on personal rather than
legal values.250
Recusal law’s disqualifying judges based on
conclusory findings of improper bias is thus “a step backward in [the]
journey” toward the rule of law.251 “Instead of rules, we have the
conclusory prohibition of a vague term that invites ad hoc and ex post
facto judgments.”252
Under current law, a challenged judge determines whether an alleged bias is disqualifying.253 This scheme curiously leaves questions
about whether a judge “shall” be mandatorily disqualified to the

247. See In re J.P. Linaham, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (“If, however,
bias and partiality be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.”); Lindsey v. City of Beaufort, 911 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D.S.C. 1995) (“Bias cannot be defined
as the total absence of preconceptions.”); Cravens, supra note 11, at 29 (“There will
always be some bias that does not rise to a level meriting recusal.”).
248. See Linaham, 138 F.2d at 652–53 (reasoning that some preconceptions represent the community’s most cherished values, and need not be disregarded by judges,
but that a judge’s other “idiosyncratic” and “uniquely personal prejudice[s]” should
not be tolerated); Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 250–52.
249. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994).
250. See id. at 552 (“[T]he pejorative connotation of the terms ‘bias’ and ‘prejudice’ demands that they be applied only to judicial predispositions that go beyond
what is normal and acceptable.”) (emphasis added); see also Spangler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (“[L]itigants are protected from
bias not by its absence but by the contours within which it must be exercised.”).
251. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the
Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1343 (2006).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., In re Bertrand, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he somewhat
surprising (and not entirely comfortable) reality is that the motion is addressed to,
and must be decided by, the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned.”);
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998) (“As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is
being challenged.”); see also Roy v. Tomlinson, 639 So.2d 1112, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (“[A] motion to disqualify a judge should be acted upon by the judge to
whom the motion is directed.”); People v. Johnson, 294 A.D.2d 908, 908 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (“[T]he court is the sole arbiter of whether it should recuse.”); Magill v.
Casel, 568 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. 1990) (“A motion for recusal must be made to the
judge sought to be disqualified.”).

PILL_CHRISTENSEN

556

5/10/2012 12:43 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

“sound discretion” of the challenged judge himself,254 running the risk
that an actually biased judge may use his discretion to deny meritorious recusal motions.255 This danger is alleviated by limiting challenged judges’ discretion by requiring them to assume the truth of
factual allegations in a recusal motion,256 and allowing them to decide
only whether those facts are legally sufficient to indicate a disqualifying bias.257 This limitation does little to prevent judges from exercising biased discretion in ruling on their own impartiality, however, because disingenuous judges can circumvent the presumption of truth
by characterizing factual claims as conclusions;258 by holding that alleged facts are not relevant;259 or by finding that alleged biases are
based on court proceedings or on general views about the law and
254. See Garcia v. Women’s Hospital, 143 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The tenor
of § 455’s language is mandatory, but this Court has recognized that disqualification
under this section ‘is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.’”); United States v. Hatchett, 978 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[28 U.S.C. § 455] is addressed to
the trial judge who is the subject of the motion to disqualify, and requires that the
judge disqualify himself from the proceeding. The use of the imperative ‘shall disqualify himself’ further demonstrates that the decision is placed squarely in the hands
of the questioned judge himself.”).
255. See Miller, supra note 238, at 461–62.
256. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33–35 (1921); United States v. Furst,
886 F.2d 558, 582 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] district judge faced with a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144, must accept the allegations of the moving party as true
. . . .”); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he judge may not
consider the truth of the facts alleged.”); Klinck v. Dist. Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Dist., 876 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1994) (“For purposes of our review, we also
must take the facts asserted in the motion and affidavits as true.”); Suarez v. State,
527 So.2d 190, 191 (Fla. 1988) (“The judge with respect to whom a motion to disqualify is made may only determine whether the motion is legally sufficient and is not allowed to pass on the truth of the allegations.”). But see, e.g., Dyson v. Sposeep, 637
F. Supp. 616, 619 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (“[T]he judge determining the motion need not
accept as true the allegations made in the recusal motion; the judge may contradict
the allegations with facts drawn from his own personal knowledge.”); State v. Mincey,
687 P.2d 1180, 1197 (Ariz. 1984) (“It is the burden of the moving party to establish
the truth of his or her allegations.”).
257. See, e.g., St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921
P.2d 821, 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (“The reviewing judge, as well as the appellate
court, passes only on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and not on the truth of the
facts alleged.”); see also supra note 45.
258. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen’s Union, 444 F.2d 1344, 1349 (2d Cir.
1971) (rejecting as conclusory a disqualification motion alleging that one party’s attorney stated that he was “very close to” the judge and “could get favored treatment
from her”).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1166 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985) (finding that allegations of a judge’s friendship with a
murder victim were not relevant to the judge’s ability to fairly try the alleged murderer because the judge’s hatred for the real killer was not relevant to his opinion
about the defendant who was merely accused of committing the murder).
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life.260 The problem is exacerbated by judges assessing the recusal
motions using a reasonable person standard.261 Even well-meaning
judges may erroneously decide both the truth and sufficiency of alleged facts because of the difficulty inherent in deciding whether the
facts would lead a reasonable person to question their impartiality
without also considering whether a reasonable person would find
those facts sufficiently plausible to convince him of anything at all.262
As a result of these malleable decisional standards, it is often the
judges who fail to recuse themselves that ought to have been disqualified, while those with the integrity to step down when challenged
could likely have judged the matter impartially in any case.263
Due in part to the discretion judges have in ruling on disqualification motions, recusal law is often inconsistent and unpredictable, further threatening litigants’ rights. The tension between the law’s encouraging disqualification in doubtful cases and the extrajudicial
source rule illustrates the problem.264 The extrajudicial source originated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky v. United States,265
where the Court held that a judge who directed deprecatory comments towards a defendant and his counsel in prior judicial proceedings was not disqualified from trying that same defendant in a later
260. The extra-judicial source rule limits biased-based disqualification to biases
that arise from the judge’s personal opinions about a party rather than any judicial
opinion the judge may form about a party based on in-court proceedings. See Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (applying the extra-judicial source rule to
motions made under 28 U.S.C. § 455); United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
583 (1966) (applying the extra-judicial source rule to motions made under 28 U.S.C. §
144); see also State v. Williams, 601 So.2d 1374, 1375 (La. 1992); Purpura v. Purpura,
847 P.2d 314, 318 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Bell v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp.,
560 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I.
1992). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 81–102; supra note 89.
261. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., United States v. Hanrahan, 248 F. Supp. 471, 477 (D.D.C. 1965),
aff’d sub nom. Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (denying recusal
motion alleging a judge threatened the defendant with prison time if he refused to
plead guilty because the “allegation is not only untrue, but also ridiculous. It is inconceivable that any sane and reasonable mind could believe that such a statement
was made . . . the court holds it to be legally sufficient.”), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845
(1967); see also Burg, supra note 22, at 1467. For a discussion of some additional logical and administrative difficulties associated with the use of the rational person
standard in recusal law see McKoski, supra note 23, at 1945–46.
263. Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 277.
264. See generally Adam J. Safer, The Illegitimacy of the Extrajudicial Source Requirement for Judicial Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 787, 791 (1993) (arguing that “the extrajudicial source requirement detracts
from judicial integrity”).
265. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
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case because the judge’s prejudice was the product of judicial proceedings and was therefore “not subject to the deprecatory characterization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice.’”266 The extrajudicial source rule, however, is at odds with the pro-recusal tenor of the federal
disqualification statutes.267 Modern disqualification law strives to
eliminate even the appearance of bias, but the extrajudicial source
rule sanctions—and even encourages268—actual partiality provided it
stems from a judge’s professional rather than personal experiences.
The “duty to sit,” raises similar problems.269 The duty to sit, which
instructs judges to decide the cases assigned to them absent compelling reasons for recusal,270 is a long standing principle of American
disqualification law, and continues to feature prominently in federal
and state court decisions despite the contemporary trend favoring
recusal.271 This doctrine places judges faced with difficult disqualification motions on the horns of a dilemma: they are obligated to sit absent compelling reasons to recuse, but must disqualify themselves
whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, a standard that is likely satisfied by any good-faith recusal motion.272
266. Id. at 551.
267. See, e.g., Safer, supra note 264.
268. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (reasoning that a judge’s personal views are
“properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed
sometimes . . . necessary to completion of the judge’s task.”).
269. See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 17, at 81; Stempel, supra note 21, at
814–18.
270. See, e.g., ABA CODE, supra note 12, Cannon 3(B)(1) (“A judge shall hear and
decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required.”); Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (en banc),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965).
271. See Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); Maier v. Orr, 758
F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir.
1979); United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976); Peterson v. Borst,
784 N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ind. 2003); Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagely &
Co., 996 P.2d 534, 538 (Utah 2000). But see, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d
764, 784 (3d Cir. 1992). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 604–12.
272. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d, 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ny
doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (“If the issue of whether §
455 requires disqualification is a close one, the judge must be recused.”); Republic of
Pan. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the question of
whether § 455(a) requires disqualification is a close one the balance tips in favor of
recusal.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.
2000) (“[T]he duty to recuse and the duty to sit do not exert equal pull; in close cases,
‘doubts ordinarily ought to be resolved in favor of recusal.’”); Union Planter’s Bank
v. L & J. Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Where the question is close,
the judge must recuse himself.” (citing United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349
(6th Cir. 1993))); Stempel, supra note 21, at 821–23.
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Wide judicial discretion in deciding recusal motions by using flexible, conclusory, and conflicting standards undermines the law’s ability
to protect litigants against partial rulings. Instead of a consistent and
predictable doctrine, recusal law is highly dependent on the whims
and personal discretion of individual judges. Instead of a rule of law,
disqualification is a law of men that provides little protection against
a truly biased judge bent on using the adjudicatory process to further
his personal value judgments.

2.

The Failure of Expansive Disqualification Doctrines to Promote
Public Confidence in the Justice System

American disqualification law’s quixotic quest to eradicate actual
and apparent judicial bias undermines public confidence in the court
system. The current regime tries to engender public trust in the judiciary with a dramatic show of force by disqualifying judges in an ever
expanding set of questionable circumstances.273 Liberal recusal
standards, however, are self-defeating. The modern doctrine threatens public confidence in the courts because by disqualifying every
judge whose “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the law
simultaneously over-enforces and under-enforces actual judicial impartiality and cheapens the idea of judicial integrity.274
Professor Rotunda observes that “[o]ne can . . . be too ethical.”275
By over-enforcing disqualification against impartial judges due to the
mere appearance of impropriety, recusal law denigrates the notion of
judicial impartiality. Like a criminal justice system that declares all
defendants guilty to be certain of incarcerating offenders, a recusal
scheme that removes every judge whose integrity might be questioned regardless of actual bias cheapens the idea of judicial impartiality to the point that judicial integrity means nothing at all.276
273. See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis,” 99 KY. L.J. 259, 289
(2010) [hereinafter McKoski, Reestablishing] (“Today, judges suffer accusations of
creating an appearance of impartiality under virtually limitless circumstances.”).
274. See generally Miller, supra note 238, at 460–61. A recent Campbell Institute
poll found that nearly seventy percent of survey participants believe that “[j]udges
always say that their decisions are based on the law and the Constitution, but in many
cases judges are really basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs.” Keith J.
Bybee, U.S. Public Perception of the Judiciary: Mixed Law and Politics, JURIST: LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Apr. 10, 2011, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/04/uspublic-perception-of-the-judiciary-mixed-law-and-politics.php
275. Rotunda, supra note 252, at 1338.
276. See id. (“Unnecessarily imprecise ethics rules allow and tempt critics, with
minimum effort, to levy a plausible and serious charge that the judge has violated
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To be sure, this aggressive approach to recusal succeeds in removing numerous impartial judges, but it also disqualifies many integrious
jurists who could have ruled impartially, simply because their presiding would create the appearance of impropriety.277 “[Disqualifying
judges] whenever there is an appearance of impropriety . . . leaves the
door wide open to increasingly broad categories or characteristics
that might give rise to an appearance of impropriety . . . . Ultimately,
this line of reasoning brings into question whether any case can be
apparently impartially judged.”278 The public likely sees large numbers of disqualifications as indicative of a partial and untrustworthy
justice system, which is, after all, precisely what a judge’s removal is
supposed to signify.279 By disqualifying capable judges whenever enterprising attorneys dredge up facts that make the judges’ presiding
look bad, the contemporary approach undermines public confidence
in the integrity of the justice system.280
The expansive, appearance-based approach to recusals may also
under-enforce actual judicial impartiality.281 Professors Cravens and
McKoski observe that the law often places the appearance of impartiality before de facto impartiality such that “the appearance of fairness is possibly more important than its actuality.”282 Disqualification
ethics rules. Overuse not only invites abuse with frivolous charges that have the patina of legitimacy, but also may eventually demean the seriousness of the charge of being unethical.”); see also Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying Judges for

Bias: A Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for Disqualification Under
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2057 (1994) (“[C]ommentators
agree that while the standards for judicial disqualification have been textually broadened, they are anything but ‘clear’ and that, consequently, public confidence in the
impartiality of the judicial process is threatened.”). Cf. Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court
Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 697–98 (1987) (articulating concern that judicial interpretations of § 455 requiring an elevated standard of proof of
bias and limiting the circumstances where bias can be found has wrongly limited the
law’s intended purpose).
277. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 289–90; Cravens, supra note
11, at 12 & nn. 52–53.
278. Cravens, supra note 11, at 19.
279. See id. at 12 & nn. 52–53; see also THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE 55–
56 (1989).
280. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 261.
281. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 13.
282. McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 261, 290; see also Cravens, supra
note 11, at 12–14; Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 1537, 1583 (2005) (“The appearance of impartiality is just as important, if not
more important, as the reality of impartiality.” (citation omitted)); Bethany Krajelis,
An Age-Old Debate Exists About Effect of Politics in the Judiciary, CHI. DAILY L.
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doctrine may consequently allow truly biased jurists to remain on the
bench so long as they are circumspect enough to not externally manifest their personal values.283 If true—or even if apparently credible—
this conclusion should give the public pause. It is all well and good to
have a justice system that looks integrious, but if it may not be so in
reality how much trust does it deserve?
Disqualification law’s expansive targeting of even remote appearances of partiality undermines the seriousness of actually biased judging, and results in the over and under-enforcement of actual judicial
impartiality. The public is likely to view courts and judges—whose
integrity can be called into question based on the scantest external
indicators—as biased, partisan, and self-serving, a far cry from the
kind of popular trust in the justice system that recusal law ought to
engender.284

3.

The Failure of Modern Recusal Law to Engender an Integrious
Judiciary

All judges are biased,285 but integrious jurists suppress their impartialities and decide cases based on the law, while unintegrious ones
enforce their personal value judgments from the bench. The root
cause of biased judging, then, is a lack of personal and professional
judicial integrity, defined as “probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness,

BULL., Apr. 21, 2010, at 1 (quoting Malcolm C. Rich, Executive Director of the Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice, The Research Arm of The Chicago Council of
Lawyers) (“You can’t have real justice until you have an appearance of justice.”).
283. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 13 (“[F]ocusing on appearances, and, more importantly, on guesswork about the meaning of those appearances, fails to hold judges
to account in a way that would ensure capture of whatever sources of actual bias
might be . . . unapparent to outside observers, particularly if they are unapparent to
the particular litigants in a given case . . . .”); see also id. at 20–21 (arguing that overemphasizing appearances may simply encourage judges to be less transparent in their
decision-making).
284. For one recent example of an attempt to impinge a respected jurist’s integrity,
see Mike McIntire, Friendship of Justice and Magnate Puts Focus on Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2011, at A1. McIntire questioned Justice Clarence Thomas’s integrity on the grounds of Thomas’s friendship with Harlan Crow, a real estate magnate,
and Crow’s support for causes championed by both Thomas and his wife, for even
though Crow was never himself a party to Supreme Court litigation, organizations on
whose boards he served had filed amicus briefs in cases before the Court. Id. It is
precisely this sort of attenuated guilt-by-association argument that the current focus
on appearances enables. See also McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 273–75
(examining the apparent partiality of an acknowledged integrious judge through the
lens of modern recusal law).
285. See supra notes 244–45.
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and soundness of character”286 and “the quality of being honest and
having strong moral principles[,] moral uprightness.”287 Modern
recusal law fails to foster these kinds of personal qualities because it
mandatorily disqualifies judges in a wide array of questionable circumstances, leaving little room for judges to develop the integrity that
is so essential to unbiased judging.
Recusal law defines the conditions under which a judge is disqualified due to actual or apparent impropriety, and directs a challenged
judge to remove himself whenever those conditions are met.288 If a
judge fails to disqualify himself when required to do so, his ruling in
the matter may be reversed and his conduct severely criticized by an
appellate court.289 Disqualification doctrines, however, do not direct
or encourage judges to be honest, of sound moral character, or to develop a strong, principled compass.290 Instead, the law takes a “bad
man” view of judges291—it assumes that judges lack the integrity to
voluntarily recuse themselves from cases in which their biases may
sway their decision-making processes, and therefore, mandatorily
disqualifies them in all questionable circumstances. Thus, as Judge
Kozinski notes, “there is a growing tendency to distrust judges—to
craft more elaborate ethical rules and restrictions; to expand the
scope of what is encompassed within the appearance of impropriety
standard; to adopt more and better methods of intruding into judges’
private lives—all in a misguided effort to promote ethical judicial behavior.”292 Instead of engendering personal honesty and probity in
judges by making them responsible for their own conduct, the current
regime treats judges like naughty little children, kicking them out of
the kitchen instead of instructing them to keep out of the cookie
jar.293

286. ABA CODE, supra note 12, at 6.
287. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011).
288. See generally supra Part I.A.
289. See Miller, supra note 238, at 462–64.
290. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
291. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457 (1897).
292. Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095,
1106 (2004).
293. See generally Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 43–47 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, eds.,
2008) (arguing that moral goods often cannot be realized through legal compulsion,
and that to facilitate individual moral integrity the law must sometimes decline to
regulate so as to enable individuals to make themselves moral).
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This paternalistic approach to ensuring impartial judging is, in part,
a result of modern recusal law’s focus on appearances.294 Even if
judges were trusted to police themselves, under the current approach,
they could not do so because the arrangement would appear questionable. Whatever mandatory disqualification rules accomplish in
terms of appearances, however, is likely negated by their failure to
promote actual integrity, the real panacea for biased judging.295 By
falling short of fostering integrious judges, the system leaves itself
open to abuse at the hands of dishonest jurists dedicated to using the
courts to further their own agendas.
B.

Duty-Focused Disqualification: Some Proposals

The drawbacks of rights-based recusal law highlight the need to
comprehensively rethink the premises and substantive standards of
the disqualification system. This Section suggests that recusal law
might be reconceptualized based on the halachic system’s dutyoriented approach, which emphasizes personal and professional judicial integrity while still protecting litigants from actually biased judgments. Professor Leubsdorf notes that “[t]o decide when a judge may
not sit is to define what a judge is. To define what a judge is is to decide what a system of adjudication is all about.”296 Subpart III.B.1.
therefore begins by developing a duty-focused conception of the roles
of courts and judges in the American adjudicatory system. With this
theoretical foundation in place, Subparts III.B.2. and III.B.3. argue
that recusal law should limit mandatory disqualification to preserving
courts’ third-party institutional role, and that judges should be given
the latitude to develop personal and professional integrity by policing
their own biases. Subpart III.B.4 suggests that recusal law should deal
with unintegrious judges’ failings to recuse when required through a
system of peer review and sanctions and by examining the substance
of their decisions for actual bias.

1.

Thinking About the Roles of Courts and Judges in the American

294. See Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics,
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 647, 653 (1994) (“In building and maintaining the image of the
judiciary, it is the reasonable perception of the people that counts—and that is all
that counts.”); Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing
the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2004) (stating that a recusal standard
defined in terms of appearances is not surprising because “in modern-day society, it is
perception, rather than reality, that has the greater importance”).
295. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 300.
296. Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 237.
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System of Adjudication
At their core, courts provide a means of disinterested third-party
dispute resolution in accordance with normative legal rules previously
acceded to by litigants.297 Whatever other legislative, executive, and
administrative functions modern courts may serve in practice, dispute
resolution remains their raison d’être —the role which courts’ other
non-adjudicative activities support.298
This conception of courts’ adjudicatory purpose features strongly
in the western political-legal tradition. John Locke posited that the
chief motivation for the creation of civil societies and legal systems
was the need to provide a neutral, principled basis for settling disagreements.299 Individuals driven by malice, self-interest, or reasonable judgments made from different perspectives disagree about how
to resolve their conflicts.300 Members of society establish legal systems to provide a mutually agreeable framework for resolving conflicts, thereby committing themselves to resolve disputes based on
rules they themselves have a hand in making.301 No system of laws
can be so perfectly crafted as to leave no room for dispute. Laws may
be vague, and subject to competing reasonable interpretations; disputes may arise from novel factual circumstances not adequately addressed by existing frameworks; and parties may disagree about the
facts underlying their dispute, or about the relevance of the broader
social implications of their conflict.302 Individuals may also disagree
about how legal norms ought to be applied in individual cases.303
Maintaining a court system tasked with resolving disputes in accord-

297. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, ET AL., THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 45
(6th ed. 2004); H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185–86 (1958); Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282, 1285–88 (1976).
298. See generally THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS 40–44 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed.,
1984).
299. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 269–78 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1960).
300. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 11–12
(2001).
301. See id. at 12; Cravens, supra note 11, at 24 (“[T]he function of law is to provide for the reasoned settlement of normative disagreements.”). See generally Berman, supra note 297, at 24–35.
302. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 300, at 12.
303. See id.
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ance with established procedures and accepted legal norms remedies
this problem.304
Courts thus function to provide mutually agreeable conflict resolutions in cases where the mere existence of a rule of law or accepted
standard of conduct is not enough. Courts must act as disinterested
third-party deciders; when a court is a party to a case, it quite simply
ceases being a court. This idea, which is often expressed conclusorily
with the maxim that “no man may be a judge in his own case,”305 goes
to the very essence of what a court is and does.306 Courts do what litigants cannot: decide cases in a mutually agreeable manner based on
legal norms and untarnished by personal interests in the result. When
a court decides a case to which it is a party, however, its ruling is not a
judicial decision, but the imposition of one litigant’s self-interested
view of the law upon others, the very antithesis of the rule of law.307
To maintain their institutional legitimacy, therefore, courts must preserve their characteristic third-party vantage relative to the cases they
decide.308
Judges’ professional duty emerges from this conception of courts’
third-party institutional role as an obligation to resolve litigious disputes by reasonably applying legal norms to the facts of each case in a
neutral and impartial manner. Whether judges are passive referees or
active problem solvers,309 whether they discover existing rules of law
and apply them to new circumstances or create new legal principles to
address evolving social norms,310 their judicial task is essentially the

304. See id. at 12–15; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964) (“In a
complex and numerous political society courts perform an essential function. No system of law—whether it be judge-made or legislatively enacted—can be so perfectly
drafted as to leave no room for dispute. When a dispute arises concerning the meaning of a particular rule, some provision for a resolution of the dispute is necessary.
The most apt way to achieve this resolution lies in some form of judicial proceeding.”).
305. COKE, supra note 21, at 141a; see supra note 21.
306. See JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 16 (2d ed. 1996) (“‘Adjudication’
refers to the process by which . . . authoritative decisions are rendered by a neutral
third party.”).
307. See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
308. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 300, at 15–17; see also JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1999).
309. See Chayes, supra note 297.
310. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 777 (1976) (discussing
various approaches to judicial decision making); see also Thomas B. Griffith, Was
Bork Right About Judges?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157 (2011).
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same: to carry out the courts’ institutional function by disinterestedly
resolving disputes in accordance with accepted rules of law.
As human embodiments of the judicial institution, judges cannot
be personally interested in the cases they decide. Interested judges
are merely litigants in robes who cease functioning in a judicial capacity, and instead impose their own self-referential view of the case on
the other parties.311 Judges therefore cannot preside over cases in
which they have a litigious interest.
In addition to adhering to the formalistic requirements that preserve courts’ disinterested third-party vantage, judges are also obligated to rule correctly based on accepted legal norms. Litigants turn
to courts to resolve their disputes, not only because they provide a
disinterested third-party forum—if process was their sole concern,
disputants would submit their disagreements to any number of
cheaper, quicker, and less adversarial alternative dispute resolution
venues.312 Parties come to court, in part, because courts are supposed
to resolve disputes in accordance with legal rules to which the litigants have consented and upon which they have relied in structuring
their relationships.313 Judges’ power over litigants thus stems from all
parties’ common commitment to the law, and judges may not use
their positions to supplant the rule of law with personal value judgments under the guise of judicial process.314 The duty to exercise authority over others only in accordance with the law to which all have
assented is of course incumbent on all citizens,315 and is particularly
important with respect to judges who, by virtue of their professional
positions have a unique ability to violate their trust, but because of

311. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
312. See Linda Mealey-Lohman & Eduardo Wolle, Pockets of Innovation in Minnesota’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Journey, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 441, 442
(2006) (“Legal practitioners use the term ADR to cover a wide variety of processes
that involve a neutral third party to help resolve disputes or conflicts.”).
313. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–6 (1990); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRY 185, 200 (2008).
314. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s
Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2010) (“What judges should
never do is use the power of their office to change the law to suit their own personal
notions of what the law should be.”).
315. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Positivism and the Good Lawyer: A
Commentary on W. Bradley Wendel’s Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1165, 1167 (2011) (“Citizens have a prima facie duty to obey the law; this
is a moral duty whose content is supplied by a political process, and in this sense it is
a duty rooted in political morality.”).
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what they represent, must be that much more cautious not to do so.316
As professionals, then, judges may not use their third-party position
to give just any answers to the questions posed by litigants; they must
give answers that are grounded in and justified under the law.317
Parties’ expectation to be judged in accordance with accepted legal
norms does not mean that jurists must give the right legal solution to
each case. Most often, there is no singularly correct answer to any
but the most simplistic legal queries,318 and the very fact that a dispute
must be adjudicated indicates that it has a number of reasonably correct resolutions based on legal norms.319 A judge’s professional duty,
therefore, is to resolve disputes in one of potentially many legally justifiable ways, not necessarily a single, objectively correct way.320 In
some sense, preserving courts’ third-party institutional position is
more important than the substance of judges’ adjudicatory dispositions. When litigants reasonably disagree about the correct legal resolution to their dispute, it does not much matter whose view a judge
enforces since both are reasonably grounded in the law. What does
matter is that the judge’s ruling emanates from a disinterested thirdparty court that reached a particular decision not because that was
the view advocated by the one litigant or the other, but because the
judge neutrally and independently determined that that was the best

316. See Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal
Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV.
945, 970 (2004) (“[J]udges’ authority and vast power invest in them a greater responsibility not only to uphold the law and not supplant their own biases, but also to shine
as a beacon of reasonableness and fair play.”).
317. See generally KEITH C. CULVER, READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 144–
92 (2007) (presenting, contrasting, and elaborating on H.L.A. Hart’s and Ronald
Dworkin’s views on the nature of a judge’s task).
318. See Discussion: The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 386, 386 (1988); see also infra note 353.
319. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 536–43 (1981) (showing a
winnowing process from grievance, to claim, to disputed claim, to the use of lawyers
and courts); cf. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 234 (2011).
320. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 24–25 (“[Adjudication] is not about requiring a
judge to give the one right reason, but about giving at least a right reason and an explanation of why it is a . . . right reason in this case.”). But see RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977) (arguing that even the hardest legal questions can, under the lens of proper judging, admit of one right answer);
Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58–84
(P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977) (same). On the so-called indeterminacy
thesis that most legal questions do not have any singularly correct answer, see generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86–
90 (2004).
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legal solution to the conflict.321 Thus, the fact that a dispute is reasonably settled in accordance with legal norms by a disinterested third
party often overshadows the precise substance of the resolution.322
As Justice Brandeis opined, “[i]t is sometimes more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled [by the court] than that it be settled right.”323 While a judge’s ruling is likely only one of many legally
correct resolutions, it can nevertheless be treated as processauthoritative because it emanates from a disinterested, third-party
court.324
Judges’ obligations are not exhausted by their issuing substantively
just rulings. As representatives of the court, judges must act in a way
that inspires confidence in courts’ ability to disinterestedly adjudicate
disputes based on legal norms.325 Judicial conduct that engenders
even incorrect impressions of partiality discredits courts’ institutional
legitimacy, and also detracts from a vigorous adversarial process, because litigants who are given reason to believe the system is weighted
against them are less likely to energetically press their cause.326 Judges, therefore, are personally obligated to maintain the appearance of
justice, even above that which is necessary to ensure substantively
correct third-party rulings, by insuring that all parties are, and believe
they are, equal under the law.327

321. In Jewish law, the principle that judicial authority stems from a court’s thirdparty position, rather than from the singular legal correctness of its rulings is illustrated by Talmudic discussion that indicates that while God’s interpretations of Torah law are undoubtedly correct, they are not authoritative as against the judgments
of competent human halachic authorities. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA
METZIAH 59b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, MOED KATAN 3:1; Menachem Elon, Law,
Truth, and Peace: “The Three Pillars of the World”, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 439,
450–53 (1997).
322. Cf. Thomas McCarthy, Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls
and Habermas in Dialogue, 105 ETHICS 44, 57 (1994) (approving the idea that those
who regard a decision-making process as “basically just” can accept as legitimate specific, resulting decisions that of which do not approve).
323. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
324. See Austin Sarat & Joel B. Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1200 (1975).
325. See supra notes 16–20; supra Part I.B.2.c.
326. See, e.g., RASHI to SHEVUOS 30a (s.v. Sheloh Y’hei Echad Omed) (“So that
one party should not see that [the court] honors his opponent more than himself, and
as a result” be intimidated into “silencing himself.”).
327. See supra notes Part I.B.2.c.
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Curtail the Role of Mandatory Disqualification in Eliminating
Judicial Bias

Based on this jurisprudential conception of the roles of courts and
judges in the adjudicatory process, duty-focused recusal reform
should begin by limiting the scope of mandatory disqualification to
instances that implicate the institutional integrity of the courts. The
current doctrine’s use of mandatory disqualification to prevent actual
and apparent judicial bias fails to protect litigants’ rights or engender
actual judicial integrity.328 The halachic model suggests that these
aims might be better achieved by limiting top-down disqualification
to cases where the judge’s sitting would be incompatible with the
court’s fundamental third-party role.329
Judges should be disqualified only when their connection to a case
is incompatible with the courts’ requisite third-party posture. In circumstances where a judge has a litigious interest in a case, the judge
should be disqualified—legally incapacitated from acting as a judge—
because interested jurists literally cease to exist in a judicial capacity
and instead take on the role of a litigious parties.330 If a judge decides
a case to which he is a party, therefore, his disposition is not a judicial
ruling in any real sense, even if it is substantively correct.331 A ruling
by a judge-litigant amounts to one party’s imposing its own selfinterested view of the law on the others and is incompatible with the
courts’ institutional function. Interested judges should be mandatorily disqualified and their rulings voided not because they are, or may
be, biased in favor of their interests, but because their sitting cannot
be squared with courts’ adjudicatory role, no matter how impartial
and integrious they may be.
Disqualification should not be used to police judicial impartiality.
The current recusal scheme disqualifies judges who are or appear to
be biased,332 but problems in this approach demonstrate that the law
is ill-suited to determine judges’ subjective impartiality, and that it
therefore tends to over and under-enforce judicial bias.333 Disqualification for bias also impinges on removed judges’ integrity, and there-

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See generally supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.
See supra notes 305–07, 311 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part I.A.2.
See generally supra Part III.A.
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fore uses flexible standards to resist removal,334 undermining public
trust in the courts and threatening litigants’ rights.335 Recusal law
might detach itself from this pernicious association between disqualification and integrity by limiting disqualification to instances where a
judge’s presiding would be incompatible with the court’s fundamental
third-party role in the adjudicatory process.336 By using disqualification to police institutional boundaries rather than to indicate professional malfeasance, duty-focused recusal law might avoid the many
problems associated with trying to legally determine judges’ subjective biases, make judges more willing to step down in disqualifying
circumstances, and thus preserve litigants’ rights and public confidence in the institutional integrity of the courts.

3.

Expand Judges’ Professional Obligation to Voluntarily Recuse

Duty-driven limitations on mandatory disqualification should be
complemented by an expansion of judges’ personal and professional
duty to voluntarily remove themselves from cases that strongly implicate their personal values. The current doctrine controls biased judging by mandatorily disqualifying partial judges. The halachic tradition, by contrast, suggests that impartial judging is better achieved by
giving judges the opportunity to assess their own biases and
integriously removing themselves from cases they feel they cannot
judge with complete, actual and apparent impartiality.
The law should instruct judges to voluntarily recuse themselves
from cases that, in their self-aware judgment, their presiding over may
result in a miscarriage of justice. As judicial professionals, judges
should step down when they feel they may unintentionally fail to uphold their duty to rule “truthfully and honestly.” As private citizens,
judges should recognize their personal obligation to recuse rather
than risk imposing their personal values on others due to uncontrollable bias.
To effectively police their own impartiality, “[j]udges need to be
ever cognizant of the effect their own personal biases have on their
decision-making process” in ways that are not presently emphasized.337 “At a minimum, judges should mentally list potential biases
334. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that “a judge may be especially reluctant to recuse himself when to do so requires
him to admit that his actual bias or prejudice has been proved”).
335. See generally supra Part III.A.
336. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
337. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994).
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that may permeate their decision-making process . . . and, with every
decision, ask themselves, ‘[c]ould any of my biases affect this decision?’”338 If, after an honest self-evaluation, a judge fears that his
personal values may taint his decision-making process, he should voluntarily recuse himself. While urging judges to err on the side of caution and recuse in doubtful cases is inconsistent with the duty to sit,339
the duty cannot be reasonably construed as an obligation to remain
on the bench when doing so may well result in injustice.340
In a duty-oriented system, the decision to recuse cannot rest on the
law’s conclusory determination of actual or apparent bias, but must
be made by each judge based on a self-aware evaluation of his own
impartiality. Contemporary recusal law attempts to preserve judicial
impartiality by mandatorily disqualifying judges that, in the law’s objective judgment, are or appear biased. This approach, however, fails
to consistently control actual bias or engender a integrious dutyconscious judiciary.341 Duty-focused voluntary recusal might avoid
conclusory and inconsistent bias-based disqualification standards by
empowering judges who are best situated to know their own minds to
determine whether they can judge a case impartially. Moreover, by
policing their own impartiality and controlling their natural desire to
vindicate their personal values from the bench, judges might develop
their own moral integrity, building a foundation for future impartial
judging. Additionally, by demonstrating the integrity, humility, and
self-discipline to voluntarily recuse from cases that could compromise
their ability to rule with complete impartiality, a duty-focused judiciary might engender public confidence in the courts in a way that the
current doctrine does not.

4.

Ensure Sound Legal Judgments and Promote Integrious Judging

Jewish law suggests that duty-focused recusal law should use substantive appellate review of judges’ decisions and peer review backed
by sanctions to ensure that judges maintain the highest standards of
integrity and impartiality. Curtailing mandatory disqualification and
giving judges the opportunity to develop their own integrity through
voluntary recusal gives dishonest jurists the opportunity to wrongfully
vindicate their personal values under the guise of judicial rulings. Duty-focused recusal law, therefore, cannot rely exclusively on the good
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text.
See generally Stempel, supra note 21.
See supra Parts III.A.1, 3.
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will of duty-conscious judges to ensure impartial judging; it must also
address the inevitability that some judges’ personal interests will get
the better of them, leading them to issue biased decisions that supplant litigants’ legal rights.
Ideally, the law should prevent problems before they arise. If dutyfocused recusal law expects judges to act integriously, it should work
to insure that only those of the highest moral character don judicial
robes. Traditional Jewish law requires dayanim to exhibit traits that
go to the heart of the judicial role.342 American recusal law, too,
should try ensuring an honest judiciary by using judicial oversight
boards to investigate judicial candidates’ integrity before they ascend
to the bench.343 These boards should be comprised of sitting and retired judges who are likely best situated to evaluate candidates’ character qualifications and aptitude for integrious judicial practice.344
While judicial discipline commissions exist in every state, and in the
federal court system as well, they do not typically engage in preappointment vetting of judicial candidates.345 These commissions
should be authorized to undertake such investigations of those that
hold themselves out to become judges, thereby helping prevent problems before they can arise.346
Prophylactic measures are no guarantee of complete success, however. Unintegrious candidates may slide through the vetting process,
and ordinarily honest judges might occasionally allow their personal
interests to get the better of them in the course of their duties. The
342. See supra note 143.
343. See generally An Introduction to Aretaic Theories on Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 7–16 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (laying out a “theory of uncontested judicial virtues” that all can agree are integral to good judging).
344. State legislatures might require candidates for elected judicial office to receive
a favorable review by a board comprised of state judges before being allowed to appear on the ballot. Candidates nominated to the federal bench could be vetted by
national or circuit-specific judicial panels staffed by sitting and retired judges with
whom the nominee would not work closely if confirmed. Such boards, restricted to
screening nominees’ character and integrity might offer non-binding recommendations to the Senate about nominees’ ethical fitness, thereby avoiding conflict with
constitutional advise-and-consent requirements. For a short discussion of the virtues
and dangers of merit selection of judges, see Miller, supra note 238, at 467–69.
345. See Gray, infra note 348, at 408–09 (discussing some commissions’ very limited authority to discipline sitting judges for actions they took prior to ascending to
the bench, and implying that review boards certainly have no jurisdiction to investigate judicial candidates); Hellman, infra note 348, at 427 (“[O]rdinarily, the [disciplinary] process begins with the [post hoc] filing of a complaint about a judge with the
clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.”).
346. For suggestions of relevant factors that vetting boards should consider, see
sources cited supra note 143, and infra note 358.
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current disqualification scheme addresses post hoc allegations of judicial misconduct through appellate review of judges’ recusal decisions347 and disciplinary action by government-sponsored judicial
conduct review commissions.348 This approach suffers from several
problems, however, and is in any case ill-suited to a duty-focused
recusal regime. Appellate courts typically reverse judges’ recusal decisions only for an abuse of discretion,349 which merely reflects and
compounds the problems related to the original disposition, including
vagueness, malleability, and inconsistency.350 Critics also identify
several problems with the current disciplinary commission scheme.351
From the perspective of duty-jurisprudence, however, perhaps the
greatest difficulty with contemporary appellate and commission re-

347. See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.
348. See generally Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 405 (2007) (outlining the jurisdictions, functions, and constitutions of
State judicial discipline boards); Arthur D. Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The
Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes and the Breyer Committee Report, 28 JUST.
SYS. J. 426 (2007) (explaining the framework for judicial discipline in the Federal system).
349. See In re Triple S Rests, Inc., 422 F.3d 405, 417 (6th Cir. 2005); Omega Eng’g,
Inc. v. Omega, 432 F.3d 437, 447 (2d Cir. 2005); Selkridge v. United Of Omaha Life
Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Where a motion for disqualification was
made in the District Court, we review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We review the refusal of a trial judge to recuse himself for abuse of discretion.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 659
(10th Cir. 2002); In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he determination of the judge concerned should be accorded great weight, and should not
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”); People v. Moreno, 515 N.E.2d 200, 202
(N.Y. 1987) (“A court’s decision in this respect may not be overturned unless it was
an abuse of discretion.”); Commonwealth v. Bonds, 890 A.2d 414 (Pa. 2005) (“Our
standard of review of a trial court’s determination not to recuse from hearing a case is
exceptionally deferential. We recognize that our trial judges are ‘honorable, fair and
competent,’ and although we employ an abuse of discretion standard, we do so recognizing that the judge himself is best qualified to gauge his ability to preside impartially.”). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 983–88.
350. See supra notes 253–64 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey W. Stemple,

Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial
Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 65 (2010) (noting that “[f]rom the halls of the
U.S. Supreme Court to the local judiciary and state disciplinary boards, it appears
that judges who fail to recuse when they should seldom face significant consequences
or criticism.”). While some courts review recusal decisions de novo, see, for example,
O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 997–1088 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Moody, 997 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1992); State v. O’Neill, 663 N.W.2d
292, 297 (Wis. App. 2002), this more exacting standard of review simply reflects the
problems inherent in the original disposition of recusal motions, see supra Part III.A.,
with an additional layer of unpredictability at the appellate level.
351. See Miller, supra note 238, at 467–69.
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view is that it tries to coerce judicial integrity by reversing the decisions and disciplining partial judges who fail to remove themselves
when mandatorily disqualified.352
Biased rulings should be remedied through ordinary appellate procedures providing substantive review of allegedly partial judges’ final
dispositions. Judges are obligated to issue correct rulings reasonably
grounded in legal norms, but litigants are not entitled to any particular legally justifiable decision.353 When an allegedly partial judge’s
ruling is reasonably grounded in the law, therefore, a reviewing court
should uphold the decision, notwithstanding the ethical impropriety
of the challenged judge’s failure to recuse.354 A biased judge’s failure
to recuse himself may seriously impinge his integrity, but it does not
itself speak to the substantive validity of his otherwise legally sound
decisions.355 The losing litigant will have received his due—a decision
reasonably based on accepted legal norms—and should not be allowed to burden his opponent and the court system with new proceedings simply because the trial judge had personal biases unless his
prejudices perverted the judicial decision making process.356 Appellate courts should reverse allegedly biased rulings only if those decisions cannot be justified on the basis of legal norms and thus represent the deciding judges’ subversion of litigants’ rights in favor of his
own personal values.
352. For a discussion of why such coercion undermines the basic ends of dutyfocused recusal, compare supra Parts III.A.3., III.B.2., III.B.3.
353. See supra notes 318–23 and accompanying text. Compare Christine Hayes,
Legal Truth, Right Answers and Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis, 25 DINE
ISRAEL 73 (2008) (arguing that while in the halachic system there is often one best
answer to a given legal question, this does not mean that there is only one halachicly
legitimate answer), with Richard Hidary, Right Answers Revisited: Monism and Pluralism in the Talmud, 26 DINE ISRAEL 229 (2010) (arguing, contrary to Hayes, that in
fact the Jewish law tradition maintains that there can be any number of ontologically
correct answers to a given legal issue all reasonably grounded in Torah norms).
354. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 36–40; see also United States v. Vespe, 868
F.2d 1328, 1342 (3d Cir. 1989); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush
v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally, 16 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 375, 440 n.375 (2003)
(“Where an appellant complains that a trial judge who should have recused himself
granted or denied a summary judgment, or made another decision that is reviewed
on appeal de novo anyway, it may be particularly appropriate to treat
the failure to recuse as harmless because de novo review prevents any harm that a
biased judge could inflict.”).
355. See Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 799 (Okla. 2001) (holding that the issuing
judge’s bias is no reason to vacate an otherwise substantively just decision); supra
notes 137–138; see also Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374,
386 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that violation of the recusal standard “involving only the
appearance of impropriety does not automatically require a new trial”).
356. See supra notes 318–27.
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Substantive appellate review only corrects actually biased rulings
grounded in judges’ personal prejudices. It fails to ensure an
integrious judiciary, however, because it does not examine or correct
allegedly biased judges’ erroneous decisions not to recuse. A dutyoriented system should therefore review and sanction judicial misconduct using judicially-sponsored discipline commissions.357 The
commissions should be organized by state bar or judicial associations
or informally by judges themselves rather than by the government,
and they should be staffed by sitting or retired judges well-attuned to
the pressures and nuances of judicial practice. The committees’ actions would then symbolically and actually stem from the dutyconscious, self-disciplining members of the judiciary themselves rather than from the government. In examining a judge’s allegedly
wrongful failure to recuse himself, disciplinary commissions could
flexibly review the facts surrounding the complaint, and in crafting
appropriate sanctions, consider the nature and extent of the judge’s
misconduct, his culpability, his response to the commission’s investigation, and his past reputation and record.358 Independent, flexible,
and integriously firm disciplinary commissions might thus police
judges’ integrity in a way that inspires public confidence in the courts,
fosters judges’ personal and professional integrity, and protects litigants from actually partial judging.
CONCLUSION
Judging is a human endeavor, and biased judging, at its core, is a
human problem. “As the face of every person is unique, so too are
their thoughts and minds different.”359 The issues arising from our
concern for impartial judging and judge disqualification are as varied
as the diverse personalities that comprise our judiciary. No system,
357. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 300 (2010); see also Ronald J.
Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301 (2011) (advocating the appointment of an inspector general for the Federal court to oversee and enforce judicial integrity). Discipline commissions are currently employed by Federal and State courts,
though these bodies suffer from a number of serious criticisms. See generally Miller,
supra note 238, at 467–69; Stemple, supra note 350, at 75.
358. See In re Coffey’s Case, 949 A.2d 102, 115 (N.H. 2008); CYNTHIA GRAY,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 81–82
(2002); see also In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659 (Wash. 1987) (listing ten factors to
be considered by review boards in determining the appropriate punishment for judicial misconduct). See generally McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 302–03.
359. MIDRASH RABBAH, NUMBERS 21; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERACHOS
58a.
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however well designed, can fully account for the variables of individual conduct. To be effective, recusal law cannot, as it does now, rely
on systemic restraints on partial judges. Addressing the problem of
biased judging must begin at the bottom by engendering actual judicial integrity on a human level. The Torah’s universal aspirational
call, “[t]zedek, tzedek tirdof [justice, justice shall you pursue]!”360
cannot be legislated, but must be adopted and internalized by judges
imbued with a solemn sense of purpose, duty, and self-awareness.
Perhaps Judge Kozinski put it best:
Ultimately, there is no choice but to trust the judges. . . . [W]e’d all
be better off in a world with fewer rules and a more clear-cut understanding that impartiality and diligence are obligations that permeate every aspect of judicial life—obligations that each judge has the
unflagging responsibility to police for himself.361

360. Deuteronomy 16:20.
361. Kozinski, supra note 292, at 1106.

